SURENDRA KUMAR CHOTELAL Vs. ISHWARI DEVI BABURAM ARORA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE suit, out of which this second appeal has arisen, was instituted by the respondent against the appellant for possession of an accommodation on the grounds that (i) it was in quite a dilapidated condition and old and its reconstruction was necessary in the interest of the respondent which could not be carried out without it being vacated and (ii) the accommodation was required bona fide for the purpose of starting a 'doctor's shop' for her son Ashok Kumar for which she and her son did not have any other reasonably suitable accommodation of their own in their occupation in the town concerned. These constitute grounds for ejectment under clauses (h)and (f), respectively, of section 12 (1) of the M. P. Accommodation Control act, 1961. The allegations were refuted by the appellant. The claim for ejectment was decreed by the trial Court (Civil Judge, Class II, Bhind) on 23-8-1975 only on the first ground, i. e. the ground specified in clause (h) and, the appellant having elected under section 18 (I) of the Act to be placed in occupation, the trial Court directed him, in accordance with that section, to deliver possession of the accommodation to the respondent by 31-12-1975 so as to enable her to commence the work of rebuilding. The other ground, i. e. , the ground specified in clause (f) was held to be not proved. First appeal preferred by the appellant was dismissed on 14-8-1976 by the Second additional District Judge, Bhind who concurred with the trial Court's finding that the ground specified in clause (h) was available to the respondent. Being aggrieved thereby, the appellant has preferred this second appeal.

(2.) THE first contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that ejectment should be held to have been claimed only on the ground specified in clause (f) and, that ground having been negatived, the suit must fail. He has placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Ramniklal pitatnbardas Mehta v. Indradaman amratlal Sheth, AIR 1964 SC 1976. and this Court's decision in the case of Nasiruddin v. Hiramal, 1979 MPRCJ Vol. II, Note 141, in which reliance was placed on that decision of the Supreme Court. In the case of Ramniklal (supra), ejectment was claimed under the Bombay Rents, Hotels and Lodging Houses Rates control Act, hereinafter referred to as the Bombay Act, on the ground that the landlord required the entire house, including the portion occupied by the tenant, for his residential purpose. In the plaint he further stated-

(3.) THE nature of the plaint-allegations in the present case is different from the nature of the allegations in those cases. In each of those cases, the landlord came with the case that he bona fide required the accommodation for his occupation and he would occupy the same for his use after reconstructing it and he succeeded in proving his alleged bona fide requirement for use. That is not so in the present case. In paragraph No. 3 of the plaint, the respondent-plaintiff pleaded as follows. <IMG>kdm2_468_mplj_1982.jpg</IMG> The plaintiff did not say that the accommodation was to be reconstructed so as to make it suitable for the intended requirement of the son's shop or that the son would start his shop therein after its reconstruction. The averments in the plaint did not contain any connection between the grounds of ejectment stated in paragraph No. 3 of the plaint. The plaint-allegations were to the effect that ejectment was claimed on those grounds independently of each other and, in view of the plaint-averments, it does not seem to be possible to hold that the case falls only under clause (f) of section 12 (I) of the M. P. Act. Of course, if the landlord had succeeded in establishing the ground specified in clause (f), the other ground, i. e. , the ground specified in clause (f), success cannot be denied to him if he establishes the alternative ground i. e. the ground specified in clause (h ). The latest case of Hasmat Rai v. Raghu-nath Prasad, AIR 1981 SC 716. may also be referred to in that context. In that case also, ejectment was claimed on the grounds specified in clauses (f) and (h) of section 12 (1) of the M. P. Act. The ground under clause (f) was held to be not proved and the case was remanded to the first appellate Court for fresh-examination of the ground specified in clause (h) in the circumstances of the case. Therefrom, it follows that, when ejectment is claimed on the grounds specified in those clauses, the suit need not necessarily fail on the plaintiff's failure to prove the ground specified in clause (f) and the ground specified in clause (h) can still be proved exclusively. It is significant that, in ramniklal's case (supra), the landlord proved the alleged bona fide requirement of the premises for his occupation i. e. , the ground specified in clause (g) of section (i. e. , the ground specified in clause (g) of section 13 (1) of the bombay Act) and that, in Nasiruddin's case (supra) also, the landlord proved his alleged bona fide requirement under the corresponding provision in clause (f) of the M. P. Act. The position in the present case is just the reverse. Here, the landlord failed to prove the ground specified in clause (f) while he succeeded in proving the ground specified in clause (h ). In view of the said latest reported decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Has mat Rai (supra) it must be held that, when ejectment is claimed on the grounds specified in clauses (f) and (h) of section 12 (1) of the M. P. Act, failure to prove the ground specified in clause (f) need not necessarily bring about dismissal of the claim and that it still remains open to the plaintiff to establish exclusively the ground specified in clause (h ). Thus, the first contention of the learned counsel for the appellant fails.