BHAGWANDAS TIWARI Vs. GAYA PRASAD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS appeal arises out of a suit for ejectment. The suit was instituted by one Jirabai against the appellant Bhagwandas Tiwari on three grounds. The first ground was that the defendant was in arrears of rent and had not paid the arrears after notice of demand. The second ground related to the need of the plaintiff for residence. The plaintiff's case was that she was a very old, blind and feeble woman needing the help of her relatives for her daily work and, therefore, she wanted her four nephews, namely, Gaya Prasad, S. A. No. 504 of 1971 decided on 17-2 1972 (Jabalpur) from the decree passed by S. J. Surana, District Judge, Jabalpur dated 2-7 1971 in C. A. No 33-A of 1970 modifying the decree passed on 18 2-1989 by C. K. Tandon. 1st Civil Judge Class I Jabalpur in C S. No. 122-A of 1967. Rameshwar Prasad, Dwarka Prasad and Badri Prasad and their families to look after her, and as she had no sufficient accommodation in her possession for these four nephews and their families, she needed the suit accommodation. The third ground pleaded was that the house was needed for reconstruction. The defendant denied all the grounds raised in the plaint. During the pendency of the suit, the plaintiff Jirabai died and the four nephews, whose names have already been mentioned above, were substituted as legal representatives, as they were legatees under a will executed by the deceased. Some amendments were made in the plaint by the legal representatives. The trial Court decreed the suit. It was held by the trial Court that although the house could not be needed by the deceased plaintiff Jirabai, it had come in evidence that the legal representatives were living in rented accommodation and needed the house for their residence, and as they could not be compelled to live in rented accommodation when they had a house of their own, the defendant was liable to ejectment on the ground of the need of the legal representatives. It was further held that the tenant did not pay the arrears of rent on demand and did not comply with section 13 of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act. It was also held that the house was needed for reconstruction and the work of reconstruction could not be carried out without vacating the house. In the appeal filed by the defendant, the learned District Judge, Jabalpur, agreed with the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, except on the point that the house was needed for reconstruction. It was held by the District Judge that the house was not, in fact, needed for reconstruction. Against the decree passed in appeal, the defendant has filed the present second appeal.

(2.) LEARNED counsel for the appellant has argued that the Courts below were in error in holding that the appellant had not complied with section 13 of the Act. The facts and the reasoning on which it has been held that section 13 was not complied are that rent which ought to have been deposited on 15th May and 15th June was deposited on 17th June, and that although the Court was closed for vacation from 13th May to 16th June 1968, and the amount could not have been deposited during this period in Court, yet the default in depositing the rent on 15th May and 15th June could not be condoned though the rent was deposited on the opening day i. e. 17th June. In my opinion, the Courts below were entirely wrong in holding that the deposit of rent made on 17th June 1968 was not in accordance with section 13. Section 13, in so far as it is material, requires the defendant-tenant "to deposit or pay, month by month, by the 15th of each succeeding month a sum equivalent to the rent." This provision thus means that the tenant can either pay the rent to the landlord by the 15th of each succeeding month or can deposit the same in Court by the 15th of each succeeding month. The choice is left to the tenant. The requirement that the rent should be deposited in Court by the 15th of each succeeding month has to be read along with section 7 of the Madhya Pradesh General Clauses Act, 1957. This section reads as follows :

(3.) LEARNED counsel for the respondents relied upon Motilal v. Kailash (1960 M P L J 87.) In that case a decree was passed in favour of the plaintiff-landlord on the ground that he needed the accommodation for his and his family's residence. After passing of the decree the plaintiff died. The question that arose in appeal was, whether the decree so passed could be available for the benefit of his widow and children who were joined as legal representatives. It was held that the decree enured for their benefit, because the personal need of the plaintiff includes the need of his dependents and, therefore, it could not be said that the original need pleaded in the plaint vanished the moment the plaintiff died. Another case relied upon is Narsingh Rao Dania and others v. Mohammad Yasin and another, 1962 MPLJ Note 93 (S. A. No. 319 of 1961, decided on 20th Oatober 1961). which is also similar to the case of Motilal v. Kailash (supra). The distinguishing feature of both these cases is that in them a decree was passed in life-time of the plaintiff who died after the passing of the decree and the need pleaded was a composite need for himself and the dependants who were his legal representatives. In the instant case, the plaintiff died before the decree and the legal representatives cannot be said to be her dependents. The original need was strictly the need personal to the plaintiff, viz. she being old, required her nephews to reside with her. Although after the death of the plaintiff the nephews were substituted as legal representatives, their need to get the suit accommodation could not arise on the ground which was initially pleaded by the deceased-plaintiff as that need vanished on the plaintiff's death. They can no doubt claim the suit accommodation for their own residence on the ground that they arc living in rented accommodation, but this can be done only by a separate suit. The nephews were not dependents or living jointly with the plaintiff and the need of the original plaintiff could not be called their need. These facts distinguish the two decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents.