MOOLCHAND Vs. SHEODUTT PALIWAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a tenant's appeal against whom a suit for eviction has been decreed on the ground mentioned in Section 12 (1) (f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation control Act, 1961, on the finding that the house in possession of the tenant is needed by the plaintiff-landlord for using it as a lawyer's office. The plaintiff is an advocate of two or three years standing and, according to the plaint allegations, he has no other suitable accommodation for his office.

(2.) THE main dispute between the parties is, whether the house was let to the defendant for residential purposes or whether it was let for non-residential purposes. If it is held that the house was let for residential purposes, the plaintiff cannot succeed, as for getting a decree under Section 12 (1) (f) he has to establish that the accommodation was let for non-residential purposes. The trial Court committed the mistake of not framing a direct issue on this point, but I find that the parties were alive to the point in issue and they led evidence in support of their respective pleas. Omission to frame a specific issue on the point, therefore, has not prejudiced the parties.

(3.) THE question whether an accommodation is let for residential purposes or for non-residential purposes is a simple one when the contract of tenancy specifies the purpose of the tenancy. But the question becomes a vexed one when the lease, whether oral or written, is silent on that point. The expression "the accommodation let for residential purposes" as used in Clause (e) of Section 12 (1) and the expression "the accommodation let for non-residential purposes" as used in Clause (f) of the same section prima facie refer to the purpose mentioned in the lease. But when a lease is created without any restriction as to purpose, the tenant is free to use it for any purpose and strictly speaking in such a case it is difficult to say that the letting is for any particular purpose. But if this view is taken, Clauses (e) and (f) will be inapplicable to a case where tenancy is created without any express or implied limitation as to purpose and the landlord will not be able to claim possession of the accommodation even if he needs it for his own use. Such a result does not seem to have been intended by the legislature. Therefore, even if the lease docs not specify any purpose, its purpose has to be inferred by recourse to surrounding circumstances, such as the structural design of the accommodation, its location, the use to which it is put by the tenant etc. Another difficulty arises because of the fact that the Act creates only two categories of purpose viz. residential and non-residential. Therefore, if an accommodation is let or used for both residential and non-residential purposes, the Court has to decide as to what is the primary purpose for which the accommodation is let or used. If the primary purpose is residential, the accommodation will be classified as residential even if it is also used for some non-residential purpose, and vice versa. The primary purpose of letting when the lease is silent as to purpose has to be determined by drawing inferences from other facts and circumstances. The conclusion as to the quality of purpose, in such cases, is a conclusion of law and, in my opinion, it is open in second appeal to see whether the Court below has drawn correct conclusion on that point from the proved facts. This I say on the same reasoning on which it has been held that the question of landlord's bona fide need is a mixed question of law and fact; (see Madan Lal Puri v. Sain Dass Berry, 1971 Ren CJ 749 = (AIR 1973 SC 585) ).