RAMBIHARI MISRA Vs. STATE OF M P

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE present order shall govern the two peti-tions mentioned above and also, in so far as the validity of the notification under Section 4 and declaration under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act go, Misc. Petition No, 50 of 1960, in which, however, there is a separate judgment dealing with the special points raised there. In view of the frequency of such petitions it is convenient to deal in one judgment the different aspects of the problems raised in such cases with special reference to the circumstances in which certain existent rulings of this Court will apply, and those in which they may have to be distinguished.

(2.) IN all these petitions the petitioners are owners of certain lands that are being acquired for public purposes which are different in each case but about whose being public purposes there is no controversy. In all these cases one or more of the following defects are pointed out, a few more in some and a few less in others; because of them, the prayer is under Article 226 for the quashing of the land acquisition proceedings. But as they are typical, it is convenient to deal with all of them ad seriatim. They are (i) that the notifications under Section 4 are defective for insufficient particulars (ii) that the suspension of Section 5a is not valid because the Government's order has been made simultaneously with the notifications' made under Section 4: (iii) that the absence of plot numbers in the declaration under Section 6 is a fatal defect; and (iv) that the officers exercising the powers of the Collector were not properly empowered. Emphasis, however, is placed on the insufficiency of particulars in the declarations nnder Section 6.

(3.) GROUND (i) -- There is a decision by this High Court reported in Iftikhar Ahmed v. State, 1961 Jab LJ 124: (AIR 1961 Madh Pra 140), where it was held that the mere mention of the locality in a notice under Section 4 is not sufficient. That case was peculiar because there the acquisition was of some land in a crowded locality in the heart of the city of Bhopal and it was felt by the Court that it would be absurd to expect the thousands of owners of lands to go and object just on the possibility of their property also being acquired. Normally, and at all events in these cases, the position is materially different. Because of it, and because of the supreme Court ruling (vide infra) it would be proper to hold that the remarks in the judgment referred to would apply only to very special congested areas like those in that case. In this regard, it is useful to refer to the ruling of the Supreme court in Babu Barkya v. State of Bombay, AIR 1960 SC 1203.