CHATURBHUJ Vs. BHOJAMAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) On a revision application before him the learned S.J., Datia has made this reference recommending that the criminal proceedings against the applicant Chaturbhuj 'alias' Chaturesh, Executive Officer of the Datia Municipality, should be quashed as they have been started without government sanction Under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. We have the usual questions, firstly, whether the executive officer of the Datia Municipality is a public servant of the class denned in Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. secondly, whether the alleged act in question for which the complaint has been filed was one done by the executive officer in discharge of his duties or while purporting to act as such public servant. A third point has been Introduced on behalf of the executive officer, that even if he is not entitled to the benefit of Section 197, Cr.P.C. still he should not be prosecuted for this offence without the sanction of government, because there is a Rewa law now applicable to the entire V.P. providing that no public servant should be prosecuted without government sanction for an act done in the discharge of his duties or while purporting to act as such public servant. That Rewa law (Rewa State Public Servants Prosecution Act of 1827) it is contended, is supplementary to and not contradictory with the central enactment in Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. and is, therefore, not abrogated by, but continues to be in force side by side with that law.

(2.) SINCE 1948 the Datia Municipality is governed by the Rewa State Municipalities Act of 1946 which is now the law in regard to Municipalities all over the V.P. This Rewa Act itself is in its general scheme similar to the U.P. Act on the same subject; but the Secretary to the Municipality under it is in a much stronger position than the Executive Officers under the U.P. Act, a point to which we shall come again. The Secretary to the Municipality is empowered by Section 232, CJ. (2) of the Rewa State Municipalities Act to remove from a public street any obstructions, or articles exposed for sale, or structures or booths, placed there without the written permission of the Board; a public street including foot -paths and lanes, Bhoja Mal the opposite party had put up a sort of booth on a foot -path and public street at Datia in which he was selling iron utensils. The Secretary went and removed the structure. Either during the removal or immediately after it, the owner Bhoja Mal and the Secretary had a quarrel. Both of them had injuries some received by the accidental fall of the thatch of the structure, and some probably by lathi blows; each alleged that the other took the pole that had been supporting the thatch and beat him with it. Accordingly, there were two cases, both being taken up by the Magistrate at about the same time. However, the case by the Secretary against Bhoja Mal proceeded while in the present one by Bhoja Mal against the Secretary, the Magistrate was invited to give a decision on whether the case could proceed without the sanction of the State Government. The Magistrate hold that it could; whereupon an application was made before the S.J. who formed the opinion that sanction was necessary, and made this reference.

(3.) POINT No. 2. The next question is whether this alleged act of causing hurt to the owner of an unauthorised structure was one committed by the Secretary while acting or purporting to act in discharge of his official duties. If the 'duties as such public servant' are narrowly interpreted, every act for which a public servant is charged in a criminal case would naturally be outside the strict scope of his authority. It is obviously not a part of the duties of a Secretary to beat any shop -keeper who refuses to remove an unauthorised structure. But in day -to -day conduct of business this narrow and pedantic interpretation may cause serious difficulties; that is why Section 197 Cr.P.C. adds 'purporting to act', in other words, the strict scope and authority of public office might be exceeded, but it might not be so far exceeded, as to be without the colour of the office exercised in good faith. The line has to be drawn somewhere between the very narrow inner circle of official duties strictly so called, and the very large number of acts altogether outside the scope of official duties which no reasonable man would deem to be committed under the colour of that office. Where exactly that line is to be drawn is a problem not of principle but of prudence and reasonableness varying with circumstances of each case. The reported cases differ in the. application of this principle to the circumstances of each case no two of which can be similar. The vast majority of the reported cases are of criminal misappropriation, or extortion, or bribe taking, all of which lie so far outside the scope of official duties that they cannot at all be deemed to have been done while the servant was purporting to act in official capacity or was acting in the colour of his office. That is why many of the rulings cited by the parties here are not of much assistance.