STATE OF M P Vs. NOOR JAMA KHAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) INVOKING the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India the petitioners namely, State of Madhya Pradesh and the Director, Town and Country Planning have called in question the sustainability of the order dated 22-2-2000 passed by the Madhya Pradesh State Administrative Tribunal, Bhopal (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunal') in Original Application No. 68/2000.

(2.) THE facts as have been exposited in the writ petition are that Noor Jama Khan, the respondent No. 1 herein, was served with the notice compulsorily retiring him from Government Service in Public interest with effect from 29-2-2000 on the basis of recommendation of the Screening Committee dated 26-2-99. During that notice period the respondent No. 1 approached the Tribunal assailing the action of the petitioners herein and the Tribunal by the order impugned quashed the order retiring the incumbent compulsorily. The Tribunal expressed the view that the Screening Committee had not appreciated the factual scenario in proper perspective and the recommendation did not deserve to be accepted. The Tribunal took note of the fact that the Screening Committee had not kept in view the parameters which are to be made applicable for the purpose of compulsory retirement of an employee but had recommended without any proper base or foundation.

(3.) IT is not disputed before us that the respondent No. 1 at the time of passing of the impugned order was working as the Assistant Superintendent in the office of Directorate of Town and Country Planning. He entered into the service as Class IV employee in the year 1965. While so serving, in the year 1975 he was graded 'd'. In the year 1976 he was graded 'c'. It is also not disputed before UK that the respondent No. 1 was promoted sometime in early 1980's and, thereafter, in the year 1985 and lastly in the year 1998 to the post which he was holding at the time of passing of the order of compulsory retirement. It is also not disputed at the Bar that the respondent No. 1 had availed leave on 10 occasions commencing 18-9-95 to 6-6-93.