LAWS(MPH)-2002-10-121

LAXMINARAYAN Vs. SHIVLAL GUJAR AND OTHERS

Decided On October 03, 2002
LAXMINARAYAN Appellant
V/S
Shivlal Gujar And Others Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The term 'Law' is applied and taken recourse to herald the incandescent attributes of civilisation with stupendous felicity and the advancement of society is conditioned by the appropriate legal evolution. Sometimes the law is conceived as 'jus naturale', at times as 'jus civile' and some other times it is equated with 'jus honorarium'. But the term 'jus' is always important. 'Jus' should never succumb to 'Joss'. That is why it has been said that the law is not the study of words alone but a penetration into the study of nature within and nature without which are projected through words that have the moving power of life. For that Simon pure reason William Shakespeare spoke: The Law hath not been dead, though it hath slept." We have embarked upon the subject with the aforesaid prefatory note as our essay and venture is to find out whether by substitution of Sec. 100-A of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (in short 'the Code') the Legislature by taking recourse to dexterous method has completely obfuscated the rights of a litigant to maintain a Letters Patent Appeal in invocation of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the judgment and decree or order passed by a learned single Judge from an original appellate decree or order or still there is some arena which is saved, being unaffected. In this setting, we are obliged to cogitate to find out the legitimate and purposive acceptation of the provision in question.

(2.) Before we enter into the spectrum of rumination we think it seemly to exposit briefly the factual context in regard to travelling of the matter to a larger Bench. In L.P.A. No. 461/2000 defensibility of the judgment and decree dated 19-6-2000 passed by a learned single Judge in the First Appeal No. 50/96 affirming the judgment and decree dated 8-1-1996 passed by the learned First Additional District Judge, Hoshangabad was called in question. When the said appeal was listed for hearing, Mr. Divesh Jain, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1 placing reliance on the amended provision i.e. Sec. 100-A of the Code that has been brought on the statute book by The Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 2002 (in short 'the Amending Act') and the decision rendered by a Division Bench in L.P.A. No. 31/91 (Sachish Chandra Jain Vs. Shri Bhagwan) since reported in 2002 (2) MPJR 138 : 2002 (3) MPLJ 504 , raised a preliminary objection that the appeal was not maintainable and deserved to be dismissed on that score. The Division Bench hearing the matter thought it apposite that the decision rendered in the case of Sachish Chandra Jain (supra) required consideration by a larger Bench. It is appropriate to state here that in the case of Sachish Chandra Jain (supra) the Division Bench had dismissed the L.P.A. pending for more than a decade before this Court as not maintainable. In this factual backdrop the matter has been referred to the larger Bench and is before us.

(3.) The cardinal issue that arises for studied deliberation is whether by introduction of Sec. 100-A of the Code which has come into effect on 1-7- 2002 atrophies the pending appeals preferred under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent and also effaces the right of filing such appeals after the said cut- off date or the amendment does not guillotine the pending appeals prior to coming of the aforesaid provision but does decimate and nullify the right of such preferring of appeal after the said provision brought on the statute book.