JANDEL SINGH Vs. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner had lodged an FIR on 23-10-97 and P.S. Gijora had registered a Crime No. 63/97 under Ss. 341, 294, 324/34 of the Indian Penal Code (Code for short). Anyhow, neither any charge-sheet was filed nor any final report was submitted by the Police. Hence the petitioner filed a criminal complaint on 28-10-98 in Criminal Court under Ss. 341, 294, 324, 323, 506, Part II of the Code. The magistrate after usual enquiry took cognizance on 6-4-1999 under Ss. 294 and 323 of the Code and the case was committed to the Court of Session as there was a cross case which was triable by the Court of Session. The Addl. Sessions Judge on 9-2-00 after hearing both the parties held that the criminal complaint was time barred and no cognizance under Ss. 323 and 294 of the Code could be taken after elapse of a period of one year as both these offences were punishable at the most with imprisonment for one year.

(2.) The grievance of the petitioner has been that the learned Sessions Judge did not look into the provisions of S. 473 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 which authorises the Court to take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation if it is satisfied that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary so to do in the interest of justice. In the present case a cross-case was pending in the Sessions Court. Secondly, the Police had registered a crime under Ss. 341, 294, 324 and 34 of the Code, instead of directing the petitioner to the Criminal Court holding that his case is not cognizable by the Police. The Police had not filed either any charge-sheet or any final report in due time. A final report was prepared on 31-12-1997 and was got initialed by the SDO (P), Dabra thereafter. Anyhow, the same was never produced before the competent Magistrate for its acceptance. The complaint by the petitioner was only 5 days delayed. In these circumstances, actually the delay in complaint was not only properly explained but it was necessary in the interest of justice to condone delay as there had been a pending cross-case in the Court of Session.

(3.) The learned Advocate for the respondent Nos. 2 to 5 has drawn my attention to Shankar Lal v. State of M.P. 1990 Jab LJ 782 a case under Excise Act. Gyaniram v. State of M.P. 1994 Jab LJ 733, a case under S. 498-A of the Code in which delay in prosecuting the case was not explained. Mohammad Yakub Khan v. Mohammad Sharif Khan 2000 (1) C Cr J 292 (Madh Pra), a case under Ss. 294 and 223 of the Code in which the complaints were held to be time barred in absence of any explanation for delay. Of course, the provisions of S. 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure have prescribed a time limit beyond which taking cognizance of the offence is barred but in the present case the petitioner was able to show the facts and circumstances in which the delay was properly explained.