CHANDULAL GHASIRAM BARADWAR Vs. CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE question is about payment of court-fee. The contention has been that in view of Notification No. F9-1-83-B-XXI, dated 1st April, 1983, issued by the State Government, in exercise of powers conferred by Section 35 of the Court-fees Act, 1870, the appellants are entitled to exemption from payment of court-fee on the memorandum of appeal, as their annual income immediately preceding the date of presentation of plaint from all sources did not exceed rupees six thousand and that they are covered by that Notification.

(2.) BY a detailed order passed on 21-11-1990, it has been held that the exemption provided for in that notification is available in court-fee only in plaint and not in appeal. The view has been that a plain reading of that notification indicates that it applies only to plaint and not to appeal. This was because of non-inclusion of 'appeal' within its fold. The non-inclusion of appeal is deliberate and it is not the function of the Court to substitute words in any enactment. It is indeed contrary to all rules of construction to read words into an Act, unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. In B. I. G. Insurance Co. v. Itbar Singh, AIR 1959 SC 1331, the Supreme Court, while dealing with Section 96 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, held that the section was exhaustive of defences open to an insurer and refused to add word 'also' after the words 'on any of the following grounds'. The observations are : "this, the rules of interpretation, do not permit us to do unless the section as it stands is meaningless or of doubtful meaning". See also Ranula Bose v. Manmatha Nath, AIR 1945 PC. 108; Grunwick Processing Laboratories Ltd. v. Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service, (1978) 1 All. E. R. 338 (HL) and Assessing Authority-cum-Excise and Taxation Officer v. East India Cotton Mfg. Co. Ltd. , AIR 1981 SC 1610. We may also usefully quote the words of Ventakarama Aiyer, J. in Jumma Masjid v. Kodimaniandra, AIR 1962 SC 847, when, while interpreting Section 43 of the T. P. Act, 1882, it was observed :

(3.) CONSIDERATIONS based upon the above settled law prevailed earlier, when this Court passed the order dated 21-11-1990 in this case, rejecting the appellant's plea of exemption from payment of court-fee on the memorandum of appeal in view of the above notification. We are not inclined to take a different view now. We, however, notice that the learned single Judge of this Court (Dr. T. N. Singh, J.) in Jagdambe Niwad Co. v. Punjab National Bank, Gwalior, F. A. No. 52 of 1985 (Gwalior), decided on 26-3-1991 (reported in 1991 MPJR 274), has held that the notification is also applicable to memorandum of appeals; that the word 'plaint' used in the notification must be given a liberal interpretation and the meaning should be ascertained in the context of the other words which it keeps company in the specified Articles. The learned single Judge appears to have been very much impressed by the feeling that the object of a benevolent provision must not be nullified by looking at it with non-benevolent eyes and minds. With all due respect to the learned Judge, we feel that the canons of interpretation, to which we have made a reference earlier, have been completely overlooked. We do not agree that the word 'plaint' has not been used to denote any choice made purposely and deliberately to deny exemption in respect of a memorandum of appeal. On the other hand, we are of firm opinion that the omission is deliberate and the benefit of exemption is intended to be granted only to initiate litigation by filing plaint. Thereafter, once a decision is rendered, the party who wants to agitate the matter further has not been given the same facility of prosecuting that litigation in appeal without payment of court-fee. This, to us, appears to be reason behind the deliberate omission of the word 'appeal' in the said notification. It appears that the view of the Division Bench of this Court was not brought to the notice of the learned single Judge. On the other hand, we find in the report, immediately next to the aforesaid case at page 283 Ramswarup Vishist v. State of M. P. , 1991 MPJR 283, that another learned Judge has taken a view which accords with the view expressed by this Court in this case in the order dated 21-11-1990. We afirm the view so taken in Ramswarup Vishist v. State of M. P. (supra ).