(1.) The appellant, who appeals against dismissal of his suit for restitution of conjugal rights, was married to the respondent in the month of May 1978. They lived together only on two occasions, first for about 8 days and then for a few months, when the respondent-wife went back to her parents while the appellant alleges that she left the matrimonial home with her brother who came to fetch her in the Shrawan-month (it is customary in this part for the wife to go to her parents during the first Shrawan month after the marriage), the respondent's contention has been that she was very cruelly treated and was turned out. Alleging that attempts to fetch her back failed and when despite notice, the respondent did not restore conjugal relations, the appellant filed the suit for restitution of conjugal rights. The action was opposed on the ground that the respondent was treated cruelly by the appellant and his mother, the immediate cause of which, according to the respondent, was inadequate dowry. She stated that she was severely beaten and turned out of the house by the appellant and has apprehension of danger to her life in case she is made to live with the appellant. She also accused the appellant of being inhuman and cruel in falsely alleging even by making a police report that she was attempting abortion. It was also stated that the attitude of the appellant was made manifest by his total indifference towards her pregnancy and the child subsequently still-born to her.
(2.) At the stage of trial, the appellant examined himself and sought to corroborate his version by examining one more witness Shankerlal (P.W.2). The respondent remained content by examining herself alone. The learned Additional District judge dismissed the suit holding the appellant guilty of cruel treatment.
(3.) After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, I am of opinion that this appeal must be allowed. It is rather unfortunate that the parties to this litigation have fallen out only after they lived together for a few months and had hardly any time to know each other. There also does not appear to be any apparent reaction for this disruption. The respondent suggested that the poor dowry was the cause. Except for her version, there is nothing on record to support her surmise. There is no evidence if there was any settlement as to dowry or whether there was any such expectation or if any grievance at any stage was made to the respondent or her parents and, if so, in what manner. There is also no evidence regarding the status of the parties. It is, therefore, difficult to act upon the solitary testimony of the respondent that she was cruelly treated for want of proper dowry. Then again, there is hardly any evidence of cruel treatment. There is also no proper plea in that behalf. No person has been examined to say, not even the respondent's parents or brother or any other person from her place, that she even complained of the appellant's alleged cruel treatment. She alleges to have been turned out after being severely beaten and claims to be pregnant at that time. If that were so, one would normally expect her to complain of this act either to neighbours or at least to her parents on reaching their house. Absence of any such complaint by her leads to think that the plea of cruel treatment on account of poor dowry is entirely an after-thought. The learned additional District judge seems to have been led away by extraneous considerations and emotions. The record of the case, however, does not support the respondent's version.