RAMCHARAN Vs. NARSINGH DAS GANDHI DEAD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is the defendants' second appeal after having lost in the two Courts below in the matter of their eviction from the non-residen-tial premises viz. the two gumtis (cablns) in question, on the grounds under Sections 12 (1) (b) and 12 (1) (f) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961.

(2.) Present respondent-landlord's suit for eviction had been decreed by the trial Court on the grounds under Sections 12(1) (b) and 12 (1) (f) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. His claim for mesne profits was equally allowed, though all claim for interest and costs had been completely disallowed. The defendants' appeal filed against the trial Court's judgment, was dismissed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge. Morena and the trial Court's judgment and decree for eviction on the particular grounds were maintained in toto. Cross objection filed by the plaintiff-landlord in the matter of interest and costs was equally dismissed. Being aggrieved with the lower Appellate Court's judgment and decree, the defendants have come in appeal against their eviction and the plaintiff-landlord has equally filed his cross-obiection in the matter of his claim for interest and costs.

(3.) The learned counsel for the appellants-defendants has candidly stated at the outset that he does not challenge any longer the concurrent findings of facts of both the Courts below in the matter of grounds of eviction and he restricts the appeal only to the question of law, pressed for the first time in this second appeal (See this Court's Order-sheet dated 4-2-1981). Law is settled that pure question of law can be raised at any stage of appeal; and as such, leave to raise the law point has been granted to the appellants-defendants. Accordingly, the learned counsel for the appellants-defendants has pressed before me the solitary question of law that the suit for eviction of the wooden gumtis placed on the plaintiff-landlord's chabutaras could not be governed by the provisions of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, in-asmmuch as such gumtis were not covered under the definition of "accommodation" as per Section 2 (a) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act. In support of this assertion, the appellants' learned counsel has placed reliance on Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarkadas, AIR 1975 SC 1758. The learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff has tried to repel the arguments by contending that the rul;ng cited, has no application to the instant case. In the matter of cross-objection filed by the plaintiff-respondent, it has been urged by the respondent's learned counsel that both the Courts below were wrong in not allowing the interest in the particular circumstance that payment of interest was one of the terms of the Agreement on lease. Disallowance of costs by both the Courts below has equally been assailed as being without any rational bas's. In the matter of the cross-objection, appellants' learned counsel has contended that discretion of the Courts below in the matter of interest and costs does not deserve to be lightly interfered with, without any cogent and substantial grounds.