IQUBAL PRAKASH JWALADAS Vs. STATE OF M.P.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS petition for revision involves question as to jurisdiction of civil Courts to entertain a suit in respect of a claim for compensation relating to an accident which took place more than sixty days before the constitution of a Tribunal under section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Facts giving rise to the present petition may briefly be stated as follows.

(2.) PLAINTIFF Iqabal Prakash Sachdeo was riding his scooter No. M. B. K. 3453 along the road near the Residency Indore on the 4th of November 1958 at about 2 p. m, when a collision occurred between his scooter and the Station Jeep No. M. B. K. 3858. The plaintiff fell down from his vehicle and sustained injuries. The Jeep belonged to the State Government and was being driven by one Ahmadali at the material time. The plaintiff, therefore, filed a suit in the Court of District Judge, Indore on 6 -11 -1959 for the recovery of Rs. 25,500 as compensation from the defendant on the ground that the vehicle belonged to the defendant and had been driven by the defendant's employee Ahmadali. The suit was resisted by the defendant inter alia on the ground that inasmuch as Claims Tribunal had been constituted by the State of Madhya Pradesh as provided in section 110 (1) of the Motor Vehicles Act and notification specifying the area of its jurisdiction had been issued which was No. 3063 -3249/II -A (2) 59, dated 7 -8 -1969, the jurisdiction of civil Courts to entertain the suit is barred under section 1I0 -F of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.

(3.) THE learned Government Advocate Mr. Balwantsingh on the other hand emphasised that the proviso to section 110 -A (3) enables a suitor to prefer a claim to the Tribunal even in respect of accidents which might have occurred more than sixty days before its constitution. The fact that the Tribunal itself had not come into existence within two months of the accident would, according to the learned counsel be a sufficient ground for invoking powers of the Tribunal to condone the delay and since the discretionary power exercisable by the Tribunal under the proviso has to be in accordance with well established judicial principles, there is no reason to suppose that the Tribunal may not do what in law it is expected to do. The discretionary power cannot be assumed to depend ' upon the whim or caprice. In order to appreciate the respective submission of the learned counsel on either side it will be material and useful to refer to the relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.