RAM NARAIN Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) IN this Letters Patent appeal with leave from a decision of Bhutt J. (as he then was) in Second Appeal No. 764 of 1953, a preliminary objection has been raised by the learned Advocate General appearing for the opponent -State as to the competency of this appeal. Relying on the decision of a Full Bench of this Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 106 of 1958 (State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Patel Gayaprasad), he urged that the appeal was incompetent under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent as the application for leave was not made immediately after the judgment was pronounced on 31st January, 1957 as required by the rules made by this Court under Clause 27 of the Letters Patent; that the application for leave was filed on 6th February 1957; and that in these circumstances the learned Single Judge was not justified in granting leave to appeal.

(2.) THE reply of Mr. Dabir, learned counsel for the appellants, was that the judgment in Second Appeal No. 764 of 1953 was pronounced on a date of which no intimation had been given to the appellants' counsel; that the draft judgment was also not laid on the table as required by Rule 10 Chapter 4 of the High Court Rules; that the application for leave was filed immediately after the appellants came to know of the delivery of judgment; and that it was not open to a Bench hearing a Letters Patent appeal filed with leave to question the legality or propriety of the grant of leave by the Single Judge. In regard to the Full Bench decision relied on by the learned Advocate General, it was urged by Shri Dabir, learned counsel for the appellants, that the view expressed in that case on the question of competency of a Letters Patent appeal filed with leave required reconsideration. The preliminary objection taken by the learned Advocate General raises two questions, namely, (i) the interpretation of the word "immediately" occurring, in Rule -10 (Chapter -4) of the High Court Rules; and (ii) whether the discretionary power of the Single Judge to grant leave to appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent is subject to review by the Bench hearing the appeal. There are numerous decisions of this Court in which the meaning of the expression "immediately after the judgment is delivered" has been considered. It is unnecessary in this order of reference to go into a detailed discussion of the cases on the subject. A full examination of it is to be found in the judgment of Rao J. in Sakharam Vs. Laxman Misc. Civil Case No. 60 of 1955 dated 7th April, 1955, which was relied on by the Full Bench in Letters Patent Appeal No. 106 of 1958. In that case, the learned Judge observed that the word 'immediately' implies that there is a more stringent requisition than what is ordinarily implied in the word 'reasonable' and that it must receive a reasonable interpretation, so far that it cannot be considered as imposing an obligation to do what is impossible. In Sakharam's case (Supra), the judgment was posted for delivery on 21st February 1955 and the counsel seeking leave to appeal was aware of the date. The application for leave was filed on 24th February 1955 and did not disclose the grounds on which the leave was sought. It was in these circumstances that Rao J. refused leave to appeal. As we read the decision of Rao J., it appears to us that the learned Judge laid town that ''immediately" implied that the act should be done with all convenient speed having due regard to the nature and circumstances of the case. The decision of Rao J. is not an authority for the proposition that a Bench hearing a Letters Patent appeal filed with leave is entitled to review the decision of the Single Judge granting leave to appeal We would have decided the preliminary objection on this reading of the decision of Rao J. But two of the learned Judges hearing Letters Patent Appeal No 106 of 1958, relying on the decision in Sakharam's Case (Supra), have made some observations which go to suggest that an application for leave to appeal must be made without any lapse of time whatsoever immediately after the judgment is delivered; that the sufficiency or insufficiency of the cause which prevented counsel from making an application for leave to appeal could not be considered; and that the Bench hearing a Letters Patent appeal could examine the question whether the application for leave filed before the Single Judge was in conformity with Rule -10. Chapter -4, High Court Rules, and whether there were valid grounds for the grant of leave by the Single Judge. In Letters Patent Appeal No. 106 of 1958, the judgment appealed against was delivered on 25th March 1958 and the application for leave to appeal was made on 28th March 1958. The learned Single Judge granted leave. Naik J., who was a member of the Full Bench, observed: - There is no provision for the grant of leave under the circumstances of the case nor for the reasons stated by the learned Single Judge.

(3.) IT seems to us that it is difficult to reconcile the view taken by the learned Judges in Letters Patent Appeal No. 106 of 1958 with the view expressed by Rao J. in Sakharam's Case (supra) on which they relied. Rao J. made it clear that the word ''immediately" must receive a reasonable construction and that it cannot be considered as imposing an obligation to do what is impossible. This observation makes it very clear that according to the learned Judge in giving the word "immediately'' a construction, some regard must be had to the nature and circumstances of the case and the word cannot be taken as excluding altogether the possibility of any time intervening after the delivery of judgment. In other words, the import of the word "immediately" would vary with any particular case and will imply a logner or a shorter period according to the circumstances of each case. The sufficiency or insufficiency of the cause which prevented counsel from making an application without any lapse of time after delivery of judgment or even the existence or non existence of the cause has to be considered in each case.