(1.) This is an appeal by the judgment-debtor (against whom a consent decree has been passed) from the concurrent orders of the two lower Courts dismissing his objection to the execution.
(2.) The objection itself was on two grounds firstly that in the absence of rules under Section 40 Civil Procedure Code, no decree could be transferred to a Court in the Madhya Pradesh from a Court in another State. In view of the decisions of this Court in regard to this, this objection is not maintainable. The second objection is that the Court that passed the decree, that is, the Court of Civil Judge, Dhulia in the Bombay State, had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit it being exclusively cognisable by the Civil Judge at Indore.
(3.) There had been transactions between the parties at different places but the point to note is that at this stage the territorial competency of the Dhulia Court to entertain the suit cannot be questioned. The suit was filed there as long ago as 1953 and the judgment debtor appellant, as defendant raised various grounds in defence including the absence of territorial jurisdiction in the Dhulia Court. However, as the suit progressed, the defendant gave up this ground and prayed that a consent decree for Rs. 1300 plus costs might be passed against him. This was accordingly done on 20-1-1956. No payment being made, the decree was transferred for execution to a Court at Indore on 30-7-1956, and proceedings started here. It is at this stage that the judgment-debtor again raised the question of territorial jurisdiction and prayed that the executing Court should investigate the territorial competency of the decreeing Court to pass the decree at all. It was further urged that as it was a matter of inherent jurisdiction, the judgment-debtor was entitled to raise it at any stage and his earlier consent was not a bar. The same has been repeated in the first appellate Court which, however, dismissed it on the ground that the executing Court may not go behind the decree. In this Court, it is repeated and the judgment-debtor wants the controversy to be reopened certainly to his advantage as he could take several years more in getting it investigated. Actually, the provisions of Section 21, Civil Procedure Code, as interpreted by the Supreme Court are definitely against the stand taken by the judgment-debtor, especially, in this case where the decree being a consent decree, there has been altogether no miscarriage of justice.