AJAY KUMAR Vs. PRAMOD KUMAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS petition, filed under S. 482 CrPC by the complanant Ajay Kumar, is directed against the order dated 21.8.97 passed by Judicial Magistrate. First Class, Petlawad, in Cr. Case No. 498 of 1995 whereby the learned Magistrate discharged the accused persons of the charges under Ss. 323 and 342/34 IPC, on the ground that trial has not commenced even after expiry of more than one year period from the date of appearance of the accused persons. Obviously the order was passed in pursuance of Supreme Court directions contained in 'Common Cause' case (1996(II) MPWN 1 = AIR 1996 SC, 1619 : 'Common Cause' a registered Society, through its Director v. Union of India and others). The Apex Court directed :

(2.) I have perused the proceedings of the case. It is interesting to note that on 14.12.95 when charge -sheet was filed and the accused were admitted to bail, the case was adjourned to 21.8.96 for framing of charge. On 21.8.96, when the case again came up for hearing before the Court, it was again adjourned to 21.8.1997 for the same purpose. This is how the said time limit fixed by the SC was allowed to expire and the accused were discharged taking shelter under the directions of the SC in 'common cause case' (supra). It was no fault of the prosecution/ complainant that the trial in the case could not commence within the stipulated period of one year. At the first instance the Court erred in fixing the case for arguments before charge as the offence is under Ss. 323 and 342 IPC, both summons cases, and no formal charge, therefore, was required to be framed in the case. The Court could and should have explained particulars of the offence to the accused on the very first appearance in the Court and proceeded with the trial. I have no manner of doubt that the direction of the Supreme Court has been misused in the case and the accused persons have been discharged for no fault of the prosecution. The Court cannot certainly extend any advantage to the accused for its own fault. The impugned order is based on total misreading of the Supreme Court judgment and the impugned order is, therefore, liable to be set aside.

(3.) ACCORDINGLY , I allow this petition, quash the impugned order dated 21.8.97 and direct that the Court below shall proceed with the trial as a summons case and conclude the hearing at the earliest, say within 6 months from the date of appearance of the accused before the trial Court. The accused respondents are also directed to appear before the trial Court on 7.5.2001. A copy of this order be transmitted immediately to the trying Magistrate.