MUNNALAL Vs. JAGANNATH PRASAD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The scheme behind the provisions of Section 36 of the Stamp Act appears to be that where a court trying any action happens to rule rightly or wrongly that a particular document in its opinion either did not require stamp or was sufficiently stamped and admits the document then its decision is final and not liable to be questioned at any stage of the suit or proceeding in any other manner except as provided by Section 61 of the Stamp Act. The reason behind this is that the provisions of the Stamp Act excluding unstamped or insufficiently stamped documents are not intended to put an end to or to create rights of the parties. They are primarily in the interest of Government revenue. Therefore, when once a document has passed the ordeal of an investigation and the Judge trying the action has applied his mind to the question of liability to stamp duty or insufficiency thereof, it was not thought proper to subject that aspect to further discussion and decision by superior courts at the appellate or revisional stage. According to the legislature, if there was enough to persuade the judge trying the suit to admit a document his decision was final. If, therefore, the trial Court happens to reject the documents and refuses to admit the same on the ground that it was either unstamped or insufficiently stamped, the right of the party aggrieved to question such a decision against the admissibility of the document at the appellate or revisional stage has been kept intact and such a party could move the court for having the document admitted.

(2.) In view of the above said legal position, the present revision which seeks interference with the order made by the trial Court admitting a document is not at all tenable due to the bar created by Section 36 of the Stamp Act. In the suit giving rise to this revision, the plaintiffs relied on a document which was styled as a promissory note. The trial Court, however on going through its contents was of the opinion that the document though having been styled as a promissory note, was, in substance, an agreement and, therefore, the prohibition as contained under Section 35 did not apply to such a document and the same was liable to be admitted on payment of deficit stamp duty, penalty, etc. The deficit stamp duty and penalty was paid and the document was admitted by the order impugned. The defendant has come up in revision questioning the correctness of the said order.

(3.) Shri K. L. Mangal, learned counsel for the applicant-defendant contended that the bar created by Section 36 of the Stamp Act did not apply to such documents which had been specifically excluded by Section 35 of the Stamp Act. In the opinion of this Court there is nothing in the language of Section 36 so as to curtail its scope in the manner as suggested by the learned counsel for the applicant. Shri Mangal relied on certain observation made by the learned single Judge of the Assam High Court in the case of Jatindra Mohan v. Khara Singh (AIR 1964 Assam 138). It is true that to some extent the observations made in the said case do support the contention of the applicant. But in view of the constant trend of decisions repeatedly given by this Court right from 1962 onwards in the below-noted cases, I am not inclined to take a different view and adopt that as taken by the learned single Judge of the Assam High Court in Jatindra Mohan's case (supra).