GAYA PRASAD JAGANNATH PRASAD Vs. UNION OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, has been filed by the petitioner challenging the order dated 6th October 1977 passed by the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Jabalpur, exercising powers under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, and further direction to prosecute the petitioner.

(2.) THE petitioner is a contractor who was extracting limestone from a quarry of which lease was granted by the Government. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the workers employed by the petitioner-contractor are not covered under Item 8 of the Schedule of the Minimum Wages Act and they are also not covered under the notification dated 9th October 1976 issued by the Central Government fixing the minimum wages for various categories of workers employed in mining operations, as according to the learned counsel this notification talks of stone mines but stone mines do not include limestone and on this basis it was contended that the order passed by respondent No. 3 and the subsequent proceedings of prosecution deserve to be quashed. According to the learned counsel, the notification talks of employed in employment in stone mines and other types of mines have also been indicated like Kyanite mines, steatite mines and in the steatite mines, it has been further clarified (including mines producing soap stone and talc ). Thus, according to the learned counsel, if this notification was intended to apply to limestones, it would have been clearly mentioned there. He further contended that as the petitioner's workers were not covered by this notification, the order and the subsequent-proceedings deserve to be quashed. In support of this contention, he placed reliance on M. P. Mineral Industry Assocn. v. R. I. Commr. , AIR I960 SC 1068. and Labour inspector, Hyderabad v. C. S. and Co. , AIR 1972 SC 1177. It was also contended that in spite of the fact that in these decisions their Lordships of the Supreme Court interpreted Item 8 of the Schedule which talked of. employment in stone breaking or stone crushing and it was held that such operation like the extraction of limestone will not be covered by Item 8 of the Schedule; and still in the notification issued under the Act in 1976, a similar language was used and, therefore, the only inference that could be drawn is that the Legislature accepted the interpretation put on this terminology in these decisions. In support of this contention, the learned counsel placed reliance on Keshvan v. State of Bombay, AIR 1951 SC 128. and -Vajravelu v. Sp. Dy. Collector, AIR 1965 SC 1017.

(3.) LEARNED counsel appearing for the respondents contended that the decisions of their Lordships on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner will be of no avail as the word "stone" has been used in a wider sense. He further contended that the words in this notification have to be construed in the light of the scheme of the law and the purpose for which this notification was issued. He, therefore, contended that the petitioner's employees would be covered under this notification and the order passed by the respondent No. 3 and the subsequent proceedings are justified in law. Learned counsel also placed reliance on Ray Lime Stone Co. v. Sub-Div. Officers, AIR 1968 Pat. 39. and contended that this decision clearly considered the interpretation of Item 8 of the Schedule under the Minimum Wages Act. It was also contended that the manner in which the words pertaining to stones have been enumerated in the notification, with a further clarification that it includes soap stone and talc, clearly goes to show that the intention of the Legislature was to use the word "stone" in the same sense in which it is commonly understood to mean all kinds of stones including limestone and no restrictive meaning could be given to this word "stone", in view of the scheme of the notification and the purpose of the Minimum Wages Act.