ANJANI PRASAD Vs. ISHWARDIN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) One Harinandan is said to have mortgaged certain property in favour of one Vishwanath in the year 1907. Twenty one persons claiming to be heirs of the mortgagor Harinandan filed a suit (giving rise to these proceedings) for redemption of the mortgage, Some of the defendants are sued as heirs of the mortgagee Vishwanath, whale others are transferees from them. The defendants denied the mortgage and claimed right and title in the suit property independent of Vishwanath. Vasudeo, one of the original plaintiffs, died during the pendency of the suit. His legal representatives applied for substitution beyond the prescribed period of 90 days. The defendants objected to the substitution but their objection was turned down. However, by order dated 186-t969, the trial Court directed that certain plaintiffs, who are non-applicants Nos. 4 to 14 in this revision, have been unnecessarily joined as plaintiffs. Since they claimed no interest in the suit property, their names were directed to be deleted and the suit proceeded in their absence. This order dated 18-6-1969 deleting the names of those plaintiffs was not challenged then either by appeal at by revision. The suit ended in partial success of the plaintiffs and, therefore, both the parties preferred separate appeals before the District Judge against the decree passed in that suit. In appeal preferred by the plaintiffs, all those persons whose names were deleted as plaintiffs by the trial Court's order, dated 18-6-1969, were also joined as appellants. No prayer was made for permission to file appeal on their behalf. Besides attacking the correctness of the decree partly dismissing the claim, they also challenged the correctness of fee trial Court's order, dated 18-6-1969, deleting their names as plaintiffs.

(2.) The defendants objected to the joinder of those plaintiffs (non-applicants 4 to 14) as appellants principally on the ground that the order dated 18-6-1969 was a decree and since it was then not challenged, it could not now be challenged after the lapse of the requisite period of limitation. This objection was upheld and by order, dated 1-8-1973, the names of those appellants were ordered to be removed from the array of the appellants. This order was again not challenged by any proceeding before this Court. Instead, the appellants- plaintiffs in their appeal filed an application on 2-8-1973 seeking permission to amend the plaint trying to explain how the other persons, whose names were deleted, had interest in the suit property. By yet another application, the names of the other plaintiffs (non-applicants 4 to 14) were sought to ba added as appellants. Permission was also sought to file the appeal by them and it was added that the appeal already filed be treated on their behalf also. It was also alleged that the proceedings taken up to that stage by them were under the advice of the counsel, Lal Praduman Singh, a very senior Advocate of Rewa. No specific order was passed on these applications, but the appeal itself was decided on 11-12-1977. The decree of the trial Court was set aside and the suit was remanded for retrial directing the joinder of the other persons (nonapplicants 4 to 14) as plaintiffs. A revision (Civil Revision No. 79 of 1974) was preferred against that remand order. This Court vide order, dated 3-9-1976, passed in that revision set aside the remand order and directed the lower appellate Court to first decide the application, dated 2-8-1973. The parties were then heard and by the impugned order the District Judge, Rewa, allowed these applications as a result of which the non-applicants 4 to 14 have also been treated as appellants before the lower appellate Court. The plaint also stands amended. This revision is directed against this order of the District Judge.

(3.) The first contention raised by Shri Ramayan Prasad Pandey, learned counsel for the applicants, is that the order of the trial Court directing deletion of the names of the non-applicants 4 to 14 amounts to a decree. As no appeal was preferred against it, that decree had become final and could not be challenged in the manner it was permitted to be done. The term "decree" is defined in Section 2 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure to mean the formal expression conclusively determining the rights of the parties so far as the Court expressing it is concerned. The decree may either be preliminary or final and may relate to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit. After considering several authorities of various High Courts, the Supreme Court in Diwan Brothers v. Central Bank of India, Bombay, (AIR 1976 SC 1503) has held that under the definition of a decree contained in Section 2 (2), Civil P. C., the three essential conditions necessary are : (i) that the adjudication must be given in a suit; (ii) that the suit must start with a plaint and culminate in a decree; and (iii) that the adjudication must be formal and final and must be given by civil or revenue Court. And in Bai Chanchal v. S. Jalalud-din, AIR 1971 SC 1081, after referring to the provisions of Rule 3 of Order 23 and Rule 6 of Order 12, Code of Civil Procedure, it has been held that in the same suit there can be mote than one decree passed at different stages. It appears that the form of the expression is not material, but what really matters is that the adjudication must conclusively determine the rights of the parties relating to all or any of the matters in controversy in suit. In a suit, there may be issues the findings on which alone may result in disposal of the whole suit. Such finding may enable the Court to pronounce a judgment and decree may be drawn up in terms of Order 20, Rule 6 On the other hand, there may be certain issues the findings on which may not be sufficient for the decision of the suit itself. In that event, the Court may postpone the hearing of the suit for such further evidence and arguments as the case may require. There is a clear distinction between findings which result in decision of the suit and those which do not. The result of suit, i. e., its final adjudication can be embodied in a decree only when the findings on any or all the issues involved result in disposal of the whole suit. Examining the term "decree" in this light in quite some details, a Full Bench of the Nagpur High Court in Baliram Ganpatrao Bhoot v. Mano-har Damodar Bhoot, AIR 1943 Nag 204 held that a finding on any point in controversy in a suit could ordinarily be final so far as the Court is concerned, but unless that finding is such as is sufficient for the disposal of the suit, there can be no judgment and no decree and unless there is a decree there can be no appeal. A Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Barkat Ram v. S. Bhagwan Singh, AIR 1943 Lah 140 has held that the findings resulting in rejection of the plea of want of jurisdiction and limitation even if it may be treated as separate entity distinct from the rest of the judgment yet could not be treated as decree. The emphasis laid is that in order to constitute a decree the determination of questions must conclusively determine the rights of parties. Reliance there was placed upon another Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Jogodishury Debea v. Kailash Chandra, (1897) ILR 24 Cal 725. In Baliram's case (AIR 1943 Nag 204) (supra), the Full Bench of the Nagpur High Court reached a conclusion that unless a finding is of such nature as to be sufficient for decision of the suit and gives formal expression to its adjudication in the form of a decree, it cannot give rise to a right of appeal. The Full Bench further held as follows: