LALCHAND RAMCHAND JAIN Vs. KANHAIYALAL RAMBHAROSE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This reference by my learned brother Tare, J. arises out of an appeal by the judgment-debtor against an order passed by the Additional District Judge, Panna, in execution proceedings of a decree. The decree under execution was drawn up on 26th October 1956 consequent to the orders pronounced by the Judicial Commissioner, Vindhya Pradesh, on 23rd December 1955 in a miscellaneous civil appeal and a civil revision. When the decree-holder filed an application for execution for recovery of costs awarded by the Judicial Commissioner the judgment-debtor-appellant raised the objection that the application was barred by time under Article 182 of the Limitation Act as it had been filed more than three years after the date of the delivery of the order viz. 23rd December 1955. This objection was overruled by the executing court which held that as the decree in the appeal was framed and signed on 26th October 1956 and the costs were taxed in the revision petition on 20th October 1956, limitation would start from these dates, and the execution application was thus within time. The judgment-debtor then appealed to this Court.

(2.) When the appeal came up for hearing before my learned brother sitting singly, it was argued on behalf of the appellant that under Article 182(1) the limitation would begin to run from the date on which the Judicial Commissioner pronounced the order and not from the date on which the decree was formally drawn up or an order taxing the costs in the revision, petition was signed. Reliance was placed on Nathulal v. Nandram, 1959 MPLJ 1065: (AIR 1960 Madh Pra 108). In reply, the respondent contended on the authority of Bhagwant v. Liquidator, Co-operative Society, Sarphapur, ILR (1955) Nag 791 (FB) that the decree-holder would be entitled to ask for the exclusion under Section 12 of the Limitation Act of the period intervening between the pronouncement of the orders in the appeal and the revision petition and the date on which the decree was signed or costs were taxed. It was also pointed out before the learned Single-Judge that in 1959 MPLJ 1065: AIR 1960 Madh Pra 108 reliance was placed on Unida v. Rupchand, AIR 1927 Nag 1 (FB) which had already been dissented from in ILR (1955) Nag 791 (FB). The matter has now been referred to this Bench for a decision on the question of limitation arising in the appeal.

(3.) In connection with the question whether the respondent's application for execution was within time, two points arise for consideration. One is as regards the date from which limitation would run under Article 182(1) and the other is as to whether under Section 12 Limitation Act the decree-holder is entitled to deduct the period between the date of the judgment and the date on which the decree was signed in computing the period of limitation for the execution application. So far as the first point is concerned, it is no longer res integra. In ILR (1965) Nag 791 itself the Full Bench has observed that by the Code of Civil Procedure the decree bears the date of the judgment and that limitation runs from the date of the judgment irrespective of the fact when the decree is drawn up. The decision in 1959 MPLJ 1065: (AIR 1960 Madh Pra 108) only holds that under Article 182(1) the date of the decree means the date of the judgment and that limitation for an application for execution commences from the date of pronouncement of judgment and not from the date when the decree is actually prepared and signed. That decision in no way runs counter to what has been observed in Bhagwant's case, ILR (1955) Nag 791 (FB). In Nathulal's case, 1959 MP LJ 1065: (AIR 1960 Madh Pra 108) (supra) reference was no doubt made to the Full Bench decision of the late Judicial Commissioner's Court in AIR 1927 Nag 1. But that was for the purpose of showing that in that case also the question of exclusion of time under Section 12(2) Limitation Act was considered because of the undisputed proposition that limitation ran from the date 'of the judgment and not from the date when the decree was actually drawn up. The principle that limitation begins to run when the judgment is pronounced and not when the decree is drawn up was accepted in Bhagwant's case, ILR (1955) Nag 791 (FB). Therefore the fact that the Full Bench in Bhagwant's case, ILR (1955) Nag 791 (FB) (supra) dissented from the view expressed in AIR 1927 Nag 1 (FB) on the question of exclusion of time under Section 12 Limitation Act does not in any way make the decision in Nathulal's case, 1959 MP LJ 1065: (AIR 1960 Madh Pra 108) as one not in accord with the Full Bench decision in Bhagwant's case, ILR (1955) Nag 791 (supra). Therefore in the present case limitation under Article 182 for the execution application filed by the respondent must be taken as having commenced from the date of the pronouncement of the order of the Judicial Commissioner, Vindhya Pradesh, viz. 23rd December 1955.