RAMBILAS Vs. BABOOLAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE applicant is the plaintiff -landlord in a suit for ejectment and arrears. In regard to the suit the landlord prayed that the defendant should be called upon to deposit the arrears of rent. The defendant was accordingly ordered to make the deposit but as often happens, he delayed. The Court instead of visiting upon him immediately the punishment of striking off the defence, gave him time at the first instance for fifteen days with a warning that in case the defendant did not deposit within fifteen days, his defence would not be entertained. However, when the fifteen days' period ended, the defendant had not yet made tae deposit. But the Court, instead of carrying out the threat, granted him yet another term after which he made the deposit. The plaintiff has come here with the contention that once the Court itself bad threatened to strike off his defence, it could not have enlarged the time any further.

(2.) THERE is really no point of law here, as in my opinion the court did not lose its jurisdiction to enlarge the time at its discretion simply because it had issued the warning on the first occasion. In all such cases a broad distinction should be observed between two types of cases. The first is where statute prescribed a time limit for a particular step without expressly enabling the Court to enlarge it. This being a case of iron limit, the Court cannot in any event give a day more than what the Statute has given. The most common instance is where the auction bidder has to deposit the balance of the bid. The other type is where the law itself empowers the Court to enlarge the time at its discretion. In these cases, the Court, of course, has got jurisdiction to go on giving adjournments more than once notwithstanding the fact that it had threatened once to visit on the litigant the consequences of his failure. Section 5 of the Accommodation Control Act is of this type. The proviso expressly mentions that an opportunity can be given at the first instance for fifteen days to pay the rent which can be further enlarged. The general provision in this regard is Section 148 C.P.C., which in terms, applies, to where the Court grants the time and provides that it has jurisdiction to enlarge it. The phrase 'from time to time' implies that the enlargement can be done more than once. In each case the Court would consider the possible inconvenience and the past conduct of the litigant.