VRIJLAL MANNILAL & CO. Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a Letters Patent appeal from an order of Chaturvedi J., rejecting an application filed by the Appellants under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing an order made by the Deputy Commissioner of Sagar on the 6th August 1956 under Clause 25 of the Madhya Pradesh Yarn Dealers Licensing Order, 1956.

(2.) CLAUSE 25 of the Order runs as follows:

(3.) TO us it appears that the learned Single Judge, and the opponents also, did not focus their attention on the real point arising for determination in the petition under article 226. By its application under Article 226 the Appellant -firm had challenged the validity of the order dated the 6th August 1956 of the Deputy Commissioner, Sagar. under Clause 25, and prayed that the said order be quashed add the opponents be restrained from conducting any enquiry against the firm or launching any prosecution for the alleged contravention of the Licensing Order. Now, Clause 25 of the Order is plain enough to show that a direction under that clause can be made by the licensing authority against any person, whether the person is or is not a dealer as defined in Clause 2 (a). It is open to the licensing authority to make an order under Clause 25 if it has reason to believe that a contravention of any provision of the Order has been, is being, or is about to be committed by any person. The exercise of the power under Clause 25 does not, therefore, depend on proof of contravention of any provision of the Order by any person who is a dealer under the order. If the licensing authority has reasonable ground for believing that any person, no matter whether he is a dealer or not under the Order, has committed or is about to commit any contravention of the Order, then the authority would be justified in making an order under Clause 25 in respect of that person. It is, therefore, wholly irrelevant in the present case to consider whether the Appellant -firm is or is not a dealer or whether when it supplied to Sattadars yarn purchased by it that transaction did or did not amount to sale of yarn or whether the sum was carrying on the business of buying yarn wholesale or retail for sale. The legality of the order made by the Deputy Commissions did not depend on these considerations. It had to be adjudged with reference to the provisions of Clause 2S alone and by the fact whether the Deputy Commissioner did or did not have reason to believe that a contravention of the Order had been, was being, or was about to be committed by the Appellant. The reason which persuaded the Deputy Commissioner to act under Clause 25 cannot be questioned in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution, and it was never the case of the Appellant before the learned Single Judge that the Deputy Commissioner had no reason whatsoever to form the belief mentioned in Clause 25. It is not that the Deputy Commissioner had no material before him at all to form the requisite belief. The order dated the 6th August 1956 of the Deputy Commissioner must, therefore, be upheld. Learned Counsel for the Appellant stated that in compliance with the order issued by the Deputy Commissioner, the Food and Supplies Inspector visited the premises of the firm, inspected all books and documents concerning yarn and seized some yarn also. If that be so, there can be now no question of quashing the order of the Deputy Commissioner so as to prevent the Food and Supplies Inspector, Sagar, from inspecting the yarn stock of the Appellant -firm.