SHYAMLAL LACHMAN Vs. UMACHARAN RAMDULARE TIWARI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS reference arises out of second appeal No. 33 of 1959. The questions that arise for determination in this reference lie within a very narrow compass. They are: whether in a suit pending on the date of commencement of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1955, a decree for eviction can be passed except on one or more of the grounds mentioned in Section 4 (2) of the Act; whether a decree for eviction obtained before 1st January, 1959 can be executed against a tenant so long as the Act is in force except on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 4; and whether a person whose tenancy has come to an end before the commencement of the Act is a tenant for the purposes of the Act and can claim the protection given under the Act. As the question whether a person whose tenancy has been determined is a tenant within the meaning of the Act, has been decided directly by a Division Bench of this Court in Bankelal v. Sant Sharan, 1959 MP LJ 589, and the correctness of that decision was doubted, this reference was directed to be laid before a Full Bench.

(2.) SO far as the question about the applicability of the Act to pending suits for eviction is concerned, that has been considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Miss Jarbai v. Phiroj-sha, Second Appeal No. 255 of 1957, where it has been held that in all pending suits or appeals for eviction no decree for eviction can be passed except on one or more of the grounds mentioned in Section 4 of the Act and that a decree obtained before 1st January 1959 cannot be executed against the tenant so long as the Act is in force, except on one or more of the grounds stated in Section 4. Nothing more, therefore, need be said on that point.

(3.) IN regard to the other point, in 1959 MP LJ 589 (supra), it has been held that Section 17 cannot be applied, to pending suits inasmuch as a person whose tenancy has come to an end before the commencement of the Act is not a tenant for the purposes of the Act. This question was the subject-matter of the decision in Bhagwandas v. Ram-chandra, Madh B LJ 1954 HCR 616 (FB), where the view was taken that a person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy by effluxion of time or by the act of the landlord or by his own act or default, is a tenant within the meaning of the word "tenant" as defined and within the clear intention of the Legislature which enacted the definition of the word "tenant" in the Act. The learned Judges of the Division Bench who decided the case of Bankelal, 1959 MP LJ! 589 (supra), observed that the decision in the case of Madh B LJ 1954 HCR 616 (FB) (supra), was not binding on them. They were not impressed by the reasoning given in that decision. Notwithstanding all what the learned Judges deciding the case of Bankelal, 1959 MP LJ 589 (supra), have said, I do not find myself in agreement with the view they have taken. It is not necessary for me to repeat what I have said in the case of Bhagwandas, Madh B LJ 1954 HCR 16 (FB) (supra), to support my conclusion that a person whose tenancy has been determined is a tenant within the definition of the word "tenant" given in the Act and for the purposes of the Act.