KOTUMAL Vs. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, GWALIOR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a reference under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure recommending that the prosecution against the Petitioner he quashed.

(2.) A complaint was filed before the Municipal Magistrate, First Class, Gwalior alleging that on October 12, 1957 at 10 -30 a. m when the Inspector of Shops and Establishments was on a round, he found that the accused Kotumal had altered the name of his business which was contrary to the licence and he had also altered the constitution of the firm. On these grounds it was alleged that he committed an offence under Section 8 of the Madhya Bharat Shops and Establishments Act. When the complainant Ramchandra Rao was examined he stated that the change had been effected 6 months before the complaint. On this a preliminary objection was raised that the complaint could not proceed because of the provisions contained in Section 55 of the said Act. The objection was overruled by the trial Magistrate, but it has found favour with the learned Additional Sessions Judge.

(3.) THE view of the trial Magistrate is that the starting point of time under Section 55 is the date on which the offence is discovered and alleged by the complainant. In my opinion this interpretation is not sound and it does not accord with the language of the section. The expression "the date on which the offence is alleged to have been committed" refers not to the date of making the allegation, but to the date on which the offence (regarding which there is the allegation that it was committed) was committed. To put it differently, the phrase "alleged to have been committed" qualifies 'offence' and not 'date'. In this view of the matter a complaint has to be filed within 3 months of the date of the commission of the offence which is alleged to have been committed. The date on which the commission of the offence came to the knowledge of the complainant or the date on which he filed the complaint or made the allegation against the offender is not relevant. It is not usual to prescribe any time limit for launching prosecution for an offence but, when the Legislature has prescribed a time limit in the present case, the provision has to be construed as any provision of a statute of limitation.