(1.) In the present petition, the petitioner against whom an award was made by the Commissioner under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 has challenged the third proviso appended to sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923.
(2.) Section 30 of the 1923 Act deals with the right of appeal. Sub-section (1) provides that an appeal shall lie to the High Court from certain orders of the Commissioner. The first proviso appended to sub-section (1) says that no appeal shall lie against any order unless a substantial question of law is involved; the second proviso says that no appeal shall lie in any case in which the parties have agreed to abide by the decision of the Commissioner etc. while the third proviso says that no appeal by an employer under clause (a) shall lie unless the memorandum of appeal is accompanied by a certificate by the Commissioner to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him the amount payable under the order appealed against.
(3.) The challenge formed by the petitioner is that the condition imposed under third proviso to Section 30 (1) of the Act is not only onerous but is discriminatory and virtually cuts the very right of appeal by an employer. It is also submitted that in a given case the employer may not be in a position to deposit the compensation amount then he would stand disabled from filing appeal and challenging the award. It is also submitted that the third proviso does not leave any discretion in favour of the Appellate Authority to exempt the appellant from depositing the amount or reduce the amount which is required to be deposited. The submission is that a perusal of the third proviso to Section 30 (1) of the Act leads to an impossibility and therefore, is liable to be struck down. In the fairness learned Counsel for the petitioner, however, submitted that in the matter oiKhemkaran s/o Tarachand Sanodiya Vs. Union of India and others, 2005 3 MPLJ 45, a Division Bench has held against the interest of the petitioner but the said judgment requires reconsideration and the question that the third proviso is impracticable or can be made practicable was not considered by the Division Bench.