(1.) THE petitioner, by this petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, seeks issuance of an appropriate writ to quash the proceedings initiated by respondent No. 2--Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Acquisition Range, Bhopal--under Section 269C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (for short "the Act").
(2.) RIGHT at the threshold it may be noted that the petitioner has come at the stage of issuance of show-cause notice. As a general rule, this court does not interfere at that preliminary stage of issuance of notice and the noticee is left free to contest the notice before the authority concerned and seek other remedies by way of appeal and revision, etc., as may be available under the law. However, in the instant case, what is challenged is the very jurisdiction of the competent authority to issue the impugned notice. Further, the way and manner in which proceedings in the case have been conducted by the successive competent authorities, also call for judicial review of those proceedings by this court under Article 227.
(3.) THE respondents have filed a reply in oppugnation of the averments made in the petition. It is submitted that the reasons for initiation of the proceedings under Section 269D(1) have been stated clearly in the notice (annexure P2/3) itself. THE proceedings, it is explained, were initiated after obtaining a valuation report (annexure R/1) from a recognised valuer (seated at Jaipur) which furnished valid ground for initiation of acquisition proceedings against the petitioner and others. THE notice (annexure P/1) was published within the statutory period of limitation (nine months) prescribed under Section 269D and so any subsequent delay in issuance of notices to the parties or in conclusion of the proceedings are of no legal consequence. Lastly, it is contended that Chapter XX-A provides for a complete code for adjudication of the acquisition proceedings and also for the effective remedy by way of two appeals against any order which may be passed by the competent authority. THE petitioner, therefore, cannot be allowed to take recourse to the writ jurisdiction of this court without first exhausting the said alternative remedies.