MADHYA PRADESH ELECTRICITY BOARD VIDISHA Vs. HARIRAM

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The Petitioner M.P. Electricity Board has filed Writ Petition No. 4604 of 1998 against the order dated 6/06/1998 (Annexure-P/1) of the Industrial Court, Bhopal in Appeal No. 130/M.P.I.R./1997, by which the appeal of respondent Hari Ram has been allowed and the petitioner has been directed to reinstate him in service with back-wages, Writ Petition No. 4606 of 1998 against the order dated 6/06/1998 of the Industrial Court (Annexure-P/1) in Appeal No. 132/M.P.I.R./1997, Writ Petition No. 4607 of 1998 against the order dated 6/06/1998 (Annexure-P/1) of the Industrial Court in Appeal No. 131 /M.P.I.R./1997 and Writ Petition No. 4608 of 1998 against the order dated June 6, 1998 (Annexure-P/1) of the Industrial Court in Appeal No. 129/M.P.I.R./1997 for reinstatement of respondents Toran Singh, Deen Dayal, Karan Singh. Respondent Hari Ram, Toran Singh, Deen Dayal and Karan Singh have also filed separate Writ Petitions W.P. Nos. 438 of 1999, 435 of 1999, 434 of 1999 and 436 of 1999, respectively, challenging the said order in so far as the back wages have been restricted to 50% and have claimed full back wages for the period upto reinstatement in service.

(2.) It is not disputed between the parties that Hari Ram, Toran Singh, Deen Dayal and Karan Singh had been engaged by the M.P. Electricity Board in connection with its project as unskilled labourers on daily wages from time to time. It is also not disputed that their services had later been discontinued and they had, therefore, filed separate applications under the provisions of Section 31 read with Section 61 of the M.P.I.R. Act, seeking reinstatement with full back wages but the Labour Court had dismissed their claim on the ground that within any block of 12 months during the period they had stated to have worked, it was not proved that they had worked for a minimum number of 240 days to attract the requirement of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Against the dismissal of their applications, these employees had filed appeals under the provisions of Section 65 of the M.P.I.R. Act which have been allowed by separate orders passed by the Industrial Court which both, the employer and the employees, have changed in these petitions.

(3.) Learned counsel for the petitioners has raised a singular contention in impugning the correctness and the legality of the Award Annexure-P/1. According to the learned counsel, if the chart Annexure-P/9 indicating the period during which these employees had been engaged is examined, it is clear that none of them had completed the requisite period of 240 days within any block of 12 months with the result the Industrial Court ought not to have set aside the order of the Labour Court dismissing the claim of the employees. Learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that in differing from the Labour Court, the Industrial Court has mainly rested its finding on th adverse inference drawn against the employer for not having produced the Muster Rolls for part of the period during which the employees had claimed to have been employed and even if the Industrial Court harboured an impression that production of Muster Roll was essential, for just decision of the case, it should have remanded the matter to the Labour Court and permitted the employer to adduce further evidence by production of the Muster Rolls to substantiate the defence that none of the employees was entitled to the benefit of Section 25-F of the I.D. Act. Learned counsel for the employees has pointed out that once the employees deposed that they had continuously worked during the period and it was disputed by the employer on the ground that they had not been continuously engaged and in fact Muster Rolls for certain period had been produced, it was necessary for the employers to have produced the Muster Rolls for the entire period and on failure, adverse inference has rightly been drawn against the employer.