(1.) The learned Government Pleader for Land Acquisition has contended that since no protest was raised by the respondent - writ petitioners while accepting the compensation, the petition under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act (for short 'the Act') seeking reference to the civil Court is not maintainable. It is not disputed that the application under Section 18 of the Act was made within limitation. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ajit Singh vs. State of Punjab has observed thus:
(2.) In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court there is no gainsaying that since no specific procedure or form is provided for recording the protest, the fact of filing an application under Section 18 of the Act within the stipulated period of limitation will lead to an inference of fact that the petitioners never accepted the compensation without protest and the protest is very much inherent. The right to prefer a petition for proper assessment of the market value of the land acquired is inherent in the right of ownership of a person to the property that is sought to be acquired by the State. This is the only protection granted to the owner of a land. On the hyper-technical reasons of an express protest not being made the State cannot deny the land owner the right to seek reference to the Civil Court for a reasonable compensation. Fair administration of the State demands that they bestow objective approach to such a situation and that they shall not deprive the citizens of their property just for hyper-technical reasons.
(3.) The learned Government Pleader relied on Wardington Lyngdoh vs. Collector. The judgment cited by the learned Counsel for the appellant is with respect to the particular facts and circumstances of that case. The question was whether there was in fact a protest or not. The question whether the protest was express or implied did not fall for consideration before the Supreme Court . When there are two contradictory views of co-ordinate Benches, it is for the Court to take that which is in consonance with the statutory provisions of law and more reasonable. The judgment cited by the learned Counsel for the appellant does not refer to the statutory provisions of the Act nor has dealt with the earlier consistent law laid down by the Supreme Court.