PGM SPINNING LTD Vs. APSFC HYDERABAD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Both the petitions are interconnected, parties are also same therefore they are decided by this common order.

(2.) Complaint filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act against the petitioners is sought to be quashed by these petitions. Two grounds were agitated before this Court for getting the complaint quashed. One of the grounds stated was that the complaint is not maintainable as it-, has been filed beyond time. According to the complaint the cheque was issued on 26/08/1996, it was presented on 12-12-1996 before the Bank which was dishonoured with the endorsement "payment stopped by drawer". Notice was issued by the complainant to the petitioners on 30/12/1996 which was acknowledged by the petitioners on 31/12/1996. Complaint was filed on 14/02/1997. The case of the petitioners is that the statutory period of 15 days for a re-action to the notice would end on 14/01/1997. This is wrong in view of the fact that under Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 15 days clear notice has to be given which would mean that the notice period would end on 15/01/1997 and not on 14/01/1997. If it is taken as 14/01/1997, then the petitioners would have got only 14 days to react to the notice. The petitioners further state that, since the 15 days notice period expired on 14/01/1997 the complaint should have been filed on or before 13/02/1997. He contends that the statutory period of one month begins with 15/01/1997 but surprisingly states that the statutory period ends on 13/02/1997. Even if it is accepted that the period of one month starts from 15/01/1997, the period would end on 14th January, 3997 and even then the complaint is within time as it has been filed on 14/02/1997. But, this Court feels that, in this case the period of one month would start from 16/01/1997 and the complaint would have been within time even on 15/02/1997. The petitioner commit a mistake by confusing 30 days with a month. Section 142 of the Act lays down that the complaint should be made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) to proviso to Section 138. That means, once a notice is given and the payment is not made within 15 days the cause of action will start to commenced on the 16th day and the complainant would have one month time from 16th day as such, in this case the complaint would have been within time even on 15/02/1997. It is well settled that 30 days is different than a month. Section 3(38) and Section 3(35) of the General Clauses Act defines 'year' and 'month' respectively and lays down that 'year' and 'month' shall respectively mean a year and month reckoned according to the British Calendar. With regard to the definition of 'month', Hahbury's Laws of England in para 143 Volume 37, 3rd Edition it has been stated :

(3.) The learned Counsel for the petitioners has relied on a judgment of this Court in Mcmdhadi Ramcichandra Reddy v. Gopuinareddy Ram Reddy and others, Cases on Dishonour of Cheques 1998 Edition Page 40 & 1997 (3) APLJ 18 (SN), which is not helpful to the petitioner because even in that case similar method for calculation has been made. In that case, notice has been served on 12-11-1994, the 15 days time would end on 27th of November, 1994 and after that the complaint had been filed within one month. The Court also held that the complaint could have been filed by 27/12/1994, as such in the present case 1 do not find that the complaint had been filed beyond time. Therefore, this argument fails.