LAWS(APH)-1999-4-81

SURYA INDUSTRIES IDA CUDDAPAH Vs. UNION OF INDIA

Decided On April 15, 1999
SURYA INDUSTRIES, IDA CUDDAPAH Appellant
V/S
UNION OF INDIA Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The case has been remanded by the impugned order dated 14-8-1998 by the authority under the Mines & Minerals (Regulation & Development) Act, 1957, inter alia, observing that while granting the lease to the petitioner, the State Government has been guided by the fact that the impleaded party has established the industrial unit with borrowed funds. Without going into the merits of, the matter, it was observed by the authority' that the disposal of such mining lease application as envisaged under the Act and the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 does not place any premium on these considerations. It was also observed that the State Government erred in relying on this extraneous fact to reach the conclusion contained in the order granting lease in favour of the petitioner. It was further observed that the authorities did not take into consideration the relevant factors listed out in Section 11(3) of the Act for granting the mining lease. Apart from the fact, it was observed that the Government did not give an opportunity of hearing to the 5th respondent in the writ petition. Resultantly, the case was remanded to the authorities to re determine after revaluation and grant the lease in accordance with law and also according to the revised proposal along with the comparative statement indicating the status of each applicant which were furnished to the Government of India for consideration of the State Government's proposal.

(2.) The learned Counsel for the appellant contends that the order of remand is mala fide and that the Central Government had the requisite information and could have determined the matter on facts.

(3.) We find no force in the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant. The respondent-Central Government being a quasi-judicial authority is at liberty to determine the question on facts or remand the matter to the appropriate authority to determine the facts afresh in accordance with law. There is nothing on record to show the mala fides of the quasi-judicial authority remanding the case, It is not made a party in person to refute the allegation of mala fides. There is nothing for us to assume on record either factual or legal mala fides. Whether the authority determines the issue by itself exercising the jurisdiction or, remands the case to the lower authority to determine the issue in accordance with law, is the discretion of the authority and within the p6wer of remand. Nothing has been pointed out that the authority has exceeded its jurisdiction or exercised the jurisdiction for extraneous considerations. The impugned order is a speaking order and on the face of it, appears to be just. None of the reasons spelt out in setting aside the order granting lease in favour of the petitioner and remanding the case for fresh decision has been shown to be arbitrary in any manner and the view taken by the authority cannot be termed to be perverse or could not have been taken. The petitioner suffered no injustice, much less substantial injustice, as the question of lease to any of the parties has still not been decided and the matter is under consideration. It is brought to our notice that the case is fixed for 22nd April, 1999 for hearing and passing appropriate order. We have no doubt that the authority will act expeditiously and dispose of the matter preferably within two months from today,