JUMMA MOSQUE COMMITTEE Vs. ABDUL SAM MAD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Plaintiff is the appellant herein. The suit for recovery of rents, damages and for delivery of possession of the plaint schedule property, viz , Shop of Jumma Mosque, Chittoor, was decreed by the trial Court. However on appeal the suit was dismissed by holding that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Hence this appeal.

(2.) The only question, thus, this second appeal gives rise to, is one relating to jurisdiction of the Civil Court. The prime and only contention of the learned counsel for the respondent-defendant is that the suit property is not a wakf property registered under the Wakf Act so as to exempt from the governance of the A.P. Buildings (lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act and consequently the suit is not maintainable before a Civil Court.

(3.) It is pertinent to notice that in the written statement originally filed by the defendant there is a categorical and specific admission that the 'property in question is the wakf property, the owner of it is no other than the Jamia (Jumma) Mosque, Chittoor.' It is further conceded that 'All the wakfs created before or after the Wakf Act 29 of 1954 are governed by the said Act and there is no exception to this rule.' But strangely a contrary plea was taken in the additional written statement stating "so far as the plaintiff mosque is concerned it is not a wakf property and hence the suit is not maintainable." It is also alleged that there is no notification as required under the Wakf Act including the plaintiff mosque and the suit property. The plaintiff has filed a rejoinder to the additional written statement stating therein that the Jumma Mosque is notified as Wakf in the Gazette of Andhra Pradesh (Part-I) dated 1st June, 1961 at page 1607 through G.O. Ms. No. 575 dated 12th May, 1961. It is clearly stated in the G.O., that the properties of religious institution governed by the provisions of the Wakf Act are exempted from the operation of the provision of A.P. Rent Control Act. There is no dispute that the scheduled property belongs to the mosque, a religious institution, governed by the provisions of the Wakf Act and consequently the A.P. Rent Control Act has no application. Further Ex. A-18 notification in the A.P. Gazette d/28-6-1962 shows that the present mosque is pious and religious institution. Ex. A-16 is a notice issued by the Office of the Inspector-Auditor of Wakf, Chittoor district, to the present mosque fixing Rs. 180/- as the contribution to be made by the plaintiff-mosque under Sec. 46 (1) of the Wakf Act, 1954. Exs. A-14 and A-15 are the receipts issued by the Wakf Board to the plaintiff-mosque for Rs. 300/- and Rs. 200/ respectively towards the contributions it made. In this background of the documentary evidence, the specific admission of the defendant in the written statement that the schedule property is the wakf property, and the exemption of the properties of the religious institutions governed by the provision of the Wakf Act from the operation of the A.P. Rent Control Act as per G.O. Ms. No. 575 d/12-5-61, the only possible conclusion is that the suit schedule property is exempt from the governance of the provision of the A.P. Rent Control Act and consequently it is to be held that the suit does lie before the Civil Court. However, the lower appellate Court while reversing the judgment of the trial Court has pot referred to the material evidence and relevant pleadings in assigning its reasons under Order 41 Rule 31 CPC. It has also not discussed the reasoning given by the trial Court while reversing its judgment. This practice, it is settled law, as has been laid down by the Madras High Court in Mangamma vs. Paidayyal, in rendering reversing judgments seriously invalidates the appellate authority and accordingly such judgments are to be deemed to have been vitiated by an error in procedure.