M PAPALAL Vs. GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The question arising in this writ petition is one of implementation of an intrem order of the A.P. Adminstration Tubnal datcd 30-8-1988 made in R.P. No. 3462/88. In the said order it has been observed that if the petitioner's position can be consiered without disturbing the sendings in rank to the petitioner, then the petitioner, if eligible and qualified, may be considered far promotion to the post of Labour Officer/Assistant Cemmissioner of Labour from that of the Supeiintcndcnt. Till such an exercise is ccmpletcd the petitioner is to be continued as Assistant Commissiner of Labour by adjusting him in any of the vacancies said to be available in the Department.

(2.) The petitioner has filed this writ petition for the issue of a writ of mandamus to declare the action of the respondents in not implementing the orders of the A.P. Administrative Tribunal, dated 30-8-1988 made in R.P. No. 3462/88 as arbitrary and illegal.

(3.) It is no doubt true that certain final and executable orders are being enforced through the issue of suitable writs when the jurisdiction of this court is being invoked under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by persons in whose favour the orders of the Tribunal have been passed. But, this does not mean that there is any hard and fast rule under which this court is bound to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of all such persons who complain of the orders of the Tribunal not being implemented by the authorities even after a lapse of considerable time. The jurisdiction vested in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is a jurisdiction in equity and is based upon the principles of good conscience and fair play. It need not be emphasized that it also happens to be a discretionary judisdiction in the High Court. The whole concept of the High Court enforcing the final and executable orders of the Tribunal is to come to the rescue of such persons who are otherwise likely (o be left without a remedy inspite of the fact that the order has been passed by the A.P. Administrative Tribunal in their favour. It is common knowledge that the Tribunal itself does not have the power of punishing those who arc guilty of disobeying the orders of the Tribunal under the Presidential order. It has no machinery to enforce its own judgment and, therefore, the order or judgment of the Tribunal, as the case may be, is largely in the nature of a recommendation with no binding fcrce on the Slate authorities. It may not be necessary in this case to go into the jurisprudential aspect of the matter as to whether the Tribunal in this respect would he deemed to have replaced the binding and effective jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in service matters. The legal situation, therefore emerging is that it is at the didcretion of the High Court to sec whether an order of a Tribunal, which has not been henoured by the State Government, can be enforced through the order of the High Court. But in any case, it is clear beyond any doubt that the High Court is not be to pass orders of implementation in each and every case unless such orderome within the purview of being precise, final and executable orders the order of the Tribunal is of a vague and indefinite nature be it final ar interim, or if in the opinion of the High Court it is not necessary to enforce such an order through the issue of a with, then there is nothing which can bo claimed as a matter of right that the enforcement machinery of the High Court should be utilised for the purpose of execution of the orders of the Tribunal. In a decision reported in Syed Ad, Ghouse vs. State of A.P. #1 more or less the same view has been expressed by a Division Bench ol this court. It may not be inappropriate to quore the following passage from the judgment of the Division Bench which reads as follows :