V SUBBAYAMMA Vs. M VEERARAJU CHOWDARY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Rather a curious situation has arisen by a successor in office in theCourt of the Principal District Munsif, Ramachandrapuram. Admittedly the trial in the suit (O.S. 273/82) was concluded, arguments were heard and Judgment was reserved. Judgment was prepared by the predecessor in office and was kept in a sealed cover. Before pronouncing the judgment, there was an order of his tranfer. Therefore, he did not pronounce the judgment. At that time I.A. 790/89 was filed before him to re-open the matter but he did not pass any orders. His successor heard the arguments and re-opened the matter. The ground for re-opening is that the respondent's counsel wanted to address some more argument. On the basis thereof, the Court below allowed the application and re-opened the matter. Assailing the jurisdiction of the successor-officer, the C.R.P. has been filed.

(2.) The contention of Sri Gangaiah Naidu, learned counsel for thepetitioners is that once the judgment is prepared and was kept ready for pronouncement, the successor in office has no option but to pronounce the judgment and he can only correct the arithmetical errors, if any under Section 152 or review under Order 47 Rule 1, C.P.C. but cannot re-open the matter and hear further arguments. I find force in the contention. Sri Eswara Prasad, learned counsel for the respondents has contended that by operation of Rule (3) of Order 20, so long as the successor has power to pronounce the judgment and put his signature and date, by necessary implication he has got power to re-open the judgment which was prepared by his predecessor and consider the matter afresh. I find no force in the contention. Order 20, Rule-1 postulates that the Court, after the case has been heard shall pronounce judgment in open Court, either at once, or, as soon thereafter as may be practicable, on some future day; and when the judgment is to be pronounced on some future day, the Court shall fix a day for that purpose, of which due notice shall be given to the parties or their pleaders and the proviso added by CPC. Amendment Act, 1976 stipulates that within 15 days, the judgment has to be, and the later clause provides a maximum of 30 days, pronounced. Under the second proviso, it is incumbent upon the Court to give reasons for the delay if it is not pronounced within thirty days from the date of reserving the case for judgment and then pronounce the judgment. Rule 2 reads thus :

(3.) In Venkatesu vs Suryanarayana 1958-2 An. W.R 181 a DivisionBench of this Court consisting of Chandra Reddy OC. J. and Seshachalapathi, J. considered the unamended Order 20 Rule 2 and held that the word 'may' occurring therein has a compulsory force and the succeeding Judge is under an obligation to pronounce the judgment prepared but not pronounced by his predecessor and it is not competent for him to re-hear the appeal. If it is discretionary with the succeeding Judge to hear the matter de novo, it would involve the waste of judicial time and cause a great deal of hardship and inconvenience to the parties. I respectfully agree with the proposition. But in the amendment brought under the Amendment Act, 1976, the word 'shall' has been introduced making thereby manifest the intention of the Legislature to be mandatory to cut down the delay in the proceedings and mandates the successor-Judge to pronounce the Judgment written by his predecessor, in open Court and shall sign it and put the date. He shall not do anything afterwards either alter it or add anything, except as provided under Section 152 or review under Order 47 Rule 1 C.P.C. Therefore it is clear that the successor is left with no discretion to re-open the matter except to pronounce the judgment prepared by the predecessor in office. Accordingly I hold that the Court below committed material irregularity or error of jurisdiction in re-opening the matter. The C.R.P. is accordingly allowed. No costs.