(1.) These application are filed for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against the judgment and decrees of Satyanarayana Raju, which following the decision of a Division Bench of this High Court in Secy. to Government Public Works and Transport Dept. v. Adoni Ginning Factory, Writ Appeals Nos. 121 to 138, 140 and 141 of 1957 : (AIR 1959 Andh Pra 538) dismissed several writ petitions filed by these appellants. They purport to be under Article 132 as well as under Article 133 of the Constitution. "
(2.) The subject-matter of the writ petitions is the same as that concerned in those before the Division Bench. The State Government issued orders enhancing the rates for supply of electrical energy to the consumers irrespective of the agreements entered into by the Government with the consumers. The aid of Section 3 of the Madras Act XXIX of 1949 as amended by Act XIII of 1952 and also the provisions of Andhra Act I of 1955 are sought in support of the action of the Government. The consumers questioned the right to increase the rate under the guise of controlling the price using the Madras Essential Articles Control and Requisitioning (Temporary Powers) Act and the Andhra Amendment Act, 1955. They raised before the Division Bench the questions as to the nature and content of the powers available to the Government under Section 3 of the Madras Act XXIX of 1949 and also other points such as, whether there has been violation of provisions of Clause 1(1) of Article 19 and those of Article 14, as well as the ambit and scope of the executive power of the State under Article 298 with reference to the carrying on of trade or business by the State, and also the incidental question arising under Article 299 in respect of the effect of the contracts on the parties thereto, even when the Government is one of the contracting parties. The Division Bench has indeed interpreted Section 3 of Madras Act XXIX of 1949 as empowering the State Government to enhance the rates and alter the tariffs in regard to the charges for the supply of current; but in respect of the other arguments which indeed refer to the vires of the statute or to the operation of the particular provisions of the statute irrespective of the provisions as to the limitations laid down or guarantees made or fundamental rights conceded under the Constitution, it held that they lack in substance. However, the Division Bench has chosen to give leave to appeal to the unsuccessful consumers concerned in the appeals before it, and in doing so it purported to act under Article 133 of the Constitution. Alter the disposal of the appeals by the Division Bench in the above manner, the writ petitions filed by the present applicants came up for hearing before Satyanarayaria Raju J. and they were dismissed as the learned Judge had no other alternative than to follow the decision of the Division Bench. The present applications are therefore tiled for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. Here it may be mentioneded that the appeals preferred to the Supreme Court in pursuance of the leave obtained by the consumers, have been declared on 28-4-1959 to have been duly admitted.
(3.) The learned Government Pleader has contended is the first instance that the entertainment of any application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court is incompetent under Article 133 by virtue of Clause 3 of that Article, which is in the following terms: