THADI NARAYANA Vs. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The Revision petitioner was charged before the Sessions Judge, Visakhapatnam, for an offence of murder under Section 302. Indian Penal Code, and robbery under Section 392, Indian Penal Code, but was acquitted of both those charges. While thus acquitting the accused, the Sessions Judge found the accused guilty of an offence under Section 411, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced her to two years rigorous imprisonment. The accused filed a fail appeal against this conviction and sentence, which came up for hearing before our brother Sanjeeva Row Navudu, J., who set aside the conviction and sentence and remanded the case to the Court of Sessions, Visakhapatnam, for retrial on the charges already framed by the said Court at the trial of the petitioner, viz., under Sections. 302 and 392, Indian Penal Code, with the following observations :

(2.) The learned Public Prosecutor, Mr. R. v. Rama Rao. after the due notice to the petitioners advocate, at the outset raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the revision and questioned the competence of the Full Bench "to discuss any question arising out of the said criminal revision". His contention is that neither the Letters Patent, nor the Criminal Procedure Code, provides for a review on the High Courts orders, nor is there any provision under which file correctness of that order can be gone into. In the circumstances, Section 369. Criminal Procedure Code, is a bar to any consideration of the judgment of a High Court. Reliance has also been placed on Section 430, Criminal Procedure Code, which says that judgment and orders passed by an appellate Court upon appeals shall be final, except in the cases provided for in Section 417 and Chapter XXXII. In so far as the provision applies to the Subordinate Courts, they cannot be final, because they arc subject to Section 435 and the provisions of Chapter XXXIL As far as the High Court judgments are concerned, it is submitted that the orders passed in a matter before it are final. In the circumstances, he contends that the only remedy for the petitioner, if she is aggrieved by the order of the High Court, is by way of appeal to the Supreme Court.

(3.) The learned Advocate-General, on the other hand, submits that an examination of the case-law would establish the following proposition, viz., that before an accused could plead Autrefois Acquit, an appellate Court must call on him to Show cause why his acquittal should not be set aside and unless this is done the mere remand by the High Court does not preclude the accused from pleading Autrefois Acquit under Section 403, Cr. P. C and secondly the right of the accused to plead under Section 403, Cr. P. C., arises only after the accused is called upon to enter his plea to the charge and hence he is entitled to raise and invite an adjudication thereon. If he is so entitled and no adjudication is made on his plea, he has every right to come in revision and if so this Court can entertain it.