(1.) Whether an authority acting under Section 18(a) of the Indian Arms Act can be said to be exercising a judicial or quasi-judicial function with, all its incidents, or merely an administrative or executive function which impinges on the fundamental right of a citizen to acquire and hold property -- as to which there is a divergence of opinion, there is a consensus of judicial opinion that an order canceling a firearm licence, which does not satisfy the requirements of Section 18(a), is liable to be set aside by the High Court in the exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution: vide Beni Chand v. Dist. Magistrate, Banda, AIR 1953 ATI 476; Sudhansu Kanta Acharyya v. State of Bihar, AIR 1954 Pat 299; Haji Md. Vakil v. Commr. of Police, AIR 1954 Cal 157; Bugga Singh v. Dist. Magistrate Barnala AIR 1954 Pep 150; Kishore Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1954 Raj 264; Narasimha Reddy v. Dist. Magistrate, Cuddapah, AIR 1953 Mad 476; In re, State of Madras. 1957-2 Mad LJ 249 : ((S) AIR 1957 Mad 692) and Vemulu Thimmappa v. Addl. Dist. Magistrate, Anantapur, 1955 Andh WR 355.
(2.) Section 18(a) of the Indian Arms Act, is in the following terras:
(3.) It will be observed that the section requires that an order canceling a licence should on the face of it show: (a) that it was passed because in the opinion of the concerned authority such an order was necessary for the security of the public peace; and (b) that the reasons for forming that opinion have been recorded in writing by that authority.(Sa) The question for consideration in the present case is whether the order which is challenged in this Writ Petition is bad for non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of the section quoted above.