(1.) This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for the calling of the records pertaining to A.S. No. 182 of 1956 on the file of the Court of the Estates Abolition Tribunal (District Judge), West Godavari, at Eluru, and to quash the decision dated 12th April, 1958, of the Tribunal in the appeal.
(2.) The petitioners before me claim to be the ryots in Nagulapalli Mokhasa. The respondents 2 and 3 are the Mokhasadars. After the coming into force of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Convertion into Ryotwari) Act XXVI of 1948, the Settlement Officer suo motu, acting in exercise of his powers under section 9, clause (i) of the Act, started an enquiry to determine whether the Nagulapalli Mokhasa is an inam estate within the meaning of section 2, clause (7) of Act XXVI of 1948. Notices of that enquiry were duly served on the Mokhasadars and the tenants. A large mass of evidence was produced before the Settlement Officer. By an order, dated 15th May, 1950, the Settlement Officer held that though the mokhasa was a grant of a named village and, therefore, would fall within the definition of section 3 (2) (d) as amended by Act II of 10,45, inasmuch as the evidence disclosed that the grantee had and enjoyed both the warams, it would be an estate only by reason of the Third Amendment Act, Act XVIII of 1936, and therefore, not an inam estate within the meaning of section 2, clause 7 of the Madras Estates Abolition Act, Act XXVI of 1948. The ryots carried the matter in appeal to the Estates Abolition Tribunal in A.S. No. 295 of 1950. The Tribunal held that the Nagulapalli Mokhasa is an inam estate as defined in section 2 (7) of Act XXVI of 1948. An application under Article 226 of the Constitution was filed against that decision in the Madras High Court. The High Court quashed the decision of the Tribunal on the ground that it was passed by two out of three members and, therefore, invalid. The appeal (A.S. No. 295 of 1950) was remanded to the Estates Abolition Tribunal for disposal according to law. The present petitioners had also filed an independent appeal against the order of the Settlement Officer. The Estates Abolition Tribunal at Eluru (District Judge) by its order, dated 12th April, 1958, held that it was not proved that the grant of the mokhasa was of the whole or of a named village and that, therefore, it would not be an estate even under section 3 (2) (d) as amended by the Third Amendment Act, Act XVIII of 1936. It is this decision that is assailed in this petition.
(3.) In a case where the question is whether certain lands do or do not constitute an estate within the meaning of section 3 (2) (d) of the Madras Estates Land Act, and the decision has to be reached on the examination and consideration of a large mass of documentary evidence, the appropriate course would be to refer the parties ' to a suit. But where the decision is vitiated by either lack of jurisdiction or a manifest error of law, it is open to the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the order.