PUBLIC PROSECUTOR Vs. NELLURU SUBRAHMANYAM

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These appeals are directed against the judgment and order of the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Visakhapatnam directing the acquittal of the respondent, hereinafter referred to as the accused, of the three charge-sheets preferred against him under Section 16 read with Sections 7 and 2 (j) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (Central Act No. 37 of 1954) hereinafter referred to as the Act

(2.) The facts of the prosecution case are briefly as follows: On 10-8-1957, the Food Inspector, complainant in the case, proceeded to the premises of the Markendeya Rice Mill and found there a number of bags with TOOR Dhall stocked, in all amounting to 98 bags. He wanted that three quarters seer of the redgram contained in these bags be sold to him for Rs. 0-6-6. It is the case of the prosecution that the accused is the Managing Partner of Sri Rama Trading Company which company was a whole-sale dealer in pulses and other food-stuffs, that the accused is also a partner of die Markendeya Rice Mill at Visakhapatnam and that the 98 bags of Dhall have been stocked on the premises of the Markendeya Rice Mill for and on behalf of Sri Rama Trading Company. He noticed that the three lots of bags were emitting bad smell and he could know from the smell that the stocks were drenched in water. After having purchased the three quarters seer of red gram from each of the lots, the complainant (P. W. 1) prepared in the presence of mediators three separate samples and making each sample into three parts, placed them in three bottles, which were duly sealed in the presence of the witnesses. One of the bottles containing the sample from one lot, along with two other bottles similarly containing samples from the other two lots were sent to the Food Analyst, whose report showed that each one of the samples consisting of redgram shall contained an artificial water-soluble yellow coloring matter derived from coal-tar and hence the Analyst round that each of the samples sent to him was mis-branded. Hence the prosecution.

(3.) The learned Judicial First Class Magistrate, who tried the cases acquitted the accused, basing his acquittal on an erroneous view of the construction of Rule 30 of the Rules framed by the Central Government in exercise of the rule-making power conferred under the Act. He took the view that Rule 30 prescribed the maximum limit of permissible colour which may be added to any food as one grain per pound of food. From this, the learned Magistrate concluded that Rule 30 and rule 29 need not be read together. Rule 29 provides that coal tar dyes or synthetic organic colors within the permissible limits could only be employed in respect of the food stuffs enumerated in the said rule, which list did not include dhall, and concluded that under rule 30 colour may be added to any food. He held that rule 30 is not subordinate to Rule 29, and that, as in this case the quantity of colour that was shown to be contained in the samples of dhall did not amount to the maximum provided in the rule 30, the learned Magistrate held that the samples of dhall in question were not misbranded and on that ground acquitted the accused.