VUPPALA ANJANEYA CHENCHU BASAVA PMINAMMA Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The only question raised in this appeal is whether the appellant was entitled to be appointed as a village officer, under section I o of the Madras Hereditary Village Offices Act (III of 1895). Admittedly, the last male-holder died on 16th June, (1948, leaving him surviving the appellant, his only daughter. After the death of the last officer-holder, the Revenue Divisional Officer registered a minor, by name Venkataratnayya, as the office-holder. At the time of the death of the last office-holder, section 10(1) (ii) (a) of the aforesaid Act which disqualified a woman from being appointed as a village officer, was in existence. It was only subsequent to the inauguration of the Constitution and the consequent adaptation of laws deleting clause (a) of section 10(1) (ii) that the disqualification attaching to a woman for appointment as a village officer was removed.

(2.) Taking advantage of the situation, the appellant applied in 1951 to be appointed to the post of the village munsif on the ground that she was then eligible for appointment. She succeeded in getting the order of registry of the minor Venkataratnayya set aside, but the Revenue Divisional Officier did not appoint the appellant as the village officer. Instead, he appointed some other person to the post in the view the at the time when the vacancy arose she was not qualified to be appointed as such. This was confirmed on appeal by the Collector as also by the Board of Revenue in second appeal.

(3.) She then approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash those orders. Our learned brother Satyanarayana Raju, J., who heard the writ petition, ruled that as at the time when the vacancy arose the appellant was ineligible for appointment and as such section 10(1) (ii) as amended would not help the appellant. In support of this conclusion, the learned Judge relied on a Judgment of a Bench of this Court in C.R.P. No. 312 of 1954, where it was held that the relevent date for the purpose of determining the succession to a village office is the date when the succession opened and the vacancy occurred and not when the registration is made by the revenue authorities. It is this order that is now under appeal. The contention urged before us is that the material date for the purpose of enquiry under section 10(1) is the date when the appointment is actually made and not when the vacancy has arisen. In support of this view, the learned counsel relies on the judgment of Govinda Menon, J., in Rama Rao v. Board of Revenue, (1953)2 M.L.J.662, where the learned Judge observed that the state of things at the time of the registration of the appointment and not at the time of the occurrence of the vacancy that should be taken into account. We do not think we can follow tkat ruling, having regard to the pronouncement of a Bench of this Court in C.R.P. No. 312, of 1954. Nor could we agree with Sri Rajeswara Rao that this Bench decision is wrong and requires reconsideration. We think that the rule stated there is in consonance with the principle of section 10 of the Act. Section 10 opens with these words: "When a vacancy occurs in any of the village offices forming class (1) in section 3, the Collector shall fill up the vanacncy in accordance with the provisions of the following sub-sections :"