NANI P LATE RAMACHANDRAN RAO KAVADIGUDA HYDERABAD Vs. CERTIFYING OFFICER CUM DY COMR OF LABOUR HYDERABAD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This writ petition has been instituted seeking a writ of mandamus for declaring the Standing Orders certified by the 1 st respondent for the 2nd respondent establishment as ultra vires and illegal and for setting aside the order passed by the 2nd respondent on June 25, 2008 transferring the 1 st petitioner in terms of such Standing Orders.

(2.) The 2nd respondent is a Star Hotel located at Hyderabad wherein the 1 st petitioner was initially employed in the Housekeeping department. He was subsequently shifted to Horticulture wing. By an order passed on June 25, 2008, the 1st petitioner has been transferred to one of it's units coming up at Chennai. This gave rise to the present writ petition. It is the case of the petitioners that prior to the year: 2003, there was no trade union in the 2nd respondent establishment and the 2nd petitioner is a trade union which was registered on January 3, 2003 for which the 1st petitioner was one of the two Organising Secretaries. Because, the 2nd petitioner-trade union has been espousing the causes of the workmen employed in the 2nd respondent - establishment and that the 1st petitioner has been very actively involved in the affairs of the said union, he has been subjected to victimization by transferring him to the Chennai unit. Since the order of transfer has referred to the Standing Orders, as the source of power for affecting such a transfer, the present writ petition has been instituted questioning the validity of the certification accorded to the Standing Orders by the 1st respondent. It is contended that the 2nd respondent being a Hotel, falls within the definition of "industry" as defined under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. But, it is not an industrial establishment to fall within the ambit and scope of Section 2(e) of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). It should be noted that that the 1st petitioner has carried out the orders of transfer by joining duty at Chennai, though he protested about the lack of bona fide of issuing such an order.

(3.) The respondents have entered appearance and contested the writ petition. The 1st respondent - Deputy Commissioner of Labour and the Competent Authority to certify the Standing Orders under the Act, has pointed out that even a Hotel answers the definition of the expression 'industrial establishment' as elaborately defined under Section 2(e)(i)(ii) of the Act. It was also further pointed out that the Standing Orders for the 2nd respondent establishment have been certified duly following the procedure spelt out under Section 5 of the Act as of November 19, 1994. The 1st respondent has also pointed out that in somewhat similar circumstances, the Supreme Court in G.L. Hotels Limited and Others v. T.C. Sarin and Another (1993) 4 SCC 363 : 1994-II-LLJ-883; held that a 'hotel' is also a 'factory' as spelt out under Section 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948. If a hotel can be a factory, then it automatically falls within the definition of an 'industrial establishment' as defined under Section 2(e) of the Act. It must be stated, at this stage, that Sri K.Bala Gopal, learned counsel for the petitioner has fairly conceded that the provisions of the Act would get attracted to the establishment of the 2nd respondent and in view of the fact that it would be more beneficial for the workmen employed in the 2nd respondent establishment, he did not press the contention about the competence of the 1st respondent in certifying the Standing Orders for the 2nd respondent establishment on November 19, 1994 , any further.