(1.) The question at issue is whether the provisions of the A.P. Civil Courts Act, 1972 deal with the valuation of suits determining pecuniary jurisdiction overriding the provisions contained in the A.P. Court Fees & Suits Valuation Act, 1956. The matter is of practical importance and the reference has been made to the Full Court to resolve the divergence of opinion.
(2.) We may narrate the events leading to the reference. This CRP 4858 of J994 first came up before the learned single Judge. It is directed against the order passed by the Court of Subordinate Judge, Siddipet in OS No.72 of 1994 on preliminary objection raised by the defendants in the said suit, who are the petitioners herein. The objection was with regard to jurisdiction on the ground that the value of the subject matter of the suit was shown as Rs.68,000/- and the relief of declaration and consequential injunction under Section 24(b) of A.P. Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as "the Court Fees Act") was mentioned as Rs.34,000.00 being half of the value of the properties involved in the said suit. The contention of the petitioners was that, it is not the value of the properties which determines the jurisdiction, but it is the value of the relief which has to be consumed as the value of the suit determining the jurisdiction. This contention was repelled by the lower Court and it was held that the said Court had jurisdiction construing the value of the properties involved which was at Rs.68,0007 - as the value of the suit determining the jurisdiction, relying upon a judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court in G. Venkataratnam v. G, Kesuva Rao, 1991 (1) APLJ 485. The question there was with regard to jurisdiction of the High Court to maintain the appeal and Section 17(1) of A.P. Civil Courts Act (for short "the Civil Courts Act") was construed to the effect that the entire value of the property is relevant for the purpose of determining jurisdiction under the above provision and not 3/4th of the value of the subject-matter as in Section 24 read with Section 50(1) of the Court Fees Act. It is pertinent to mention that the value of the property in the said suit was arrived at Rs. 18,000.00 and the Court-fees was paid on the amount of Rs. 13,500.00 being three-fourth of the said value under Section 24(a) of Court Fees Act and Rs.13,500.00 was construed as the value of the suit and was tried by the Court of the Subordinate Judge and the Registry had raised objection that the appeal has to be valued tat Rs. 13,500.00 and according to the then existing provisions of Civil Courts Act, the appeal was maintainable only before the District Court and not the High Court, but the learned single Judge overruled the objections of the Registry holding that for appeal under Section 17(1) of Civil Courts Act, it is the entire value of the property of Rs. 18,000.00 which is the criterion and not the three-fourth of the same as was construed in the suit. The learned Judge did not rely upon Section 5(1) of the Court Fees Act on the ground that Section 17(1) of Civil Courts Act made a specific provision and as such, the said provision will prevail. There is an earlier Division Bench judgment of this Court quite contra to the view taken by the learned single Judge. But, the same was not brought to the notice of the learned Judge. The earlier judgment of the Division Bench was rendered in the case of Sidramappa v. Sangappa, AIR 1966 AP 66. Dealing with the provisions of the Court Fees Act and particularly, Section 50(1), it was held by the Division Bench that it is the valuation which is mentioned in the suit for the purpose of paying Courf-fees that determines the jurisdiction of the Court and not the value of the property involved.
(3.) When this CRP came-up for hearing, having regard to the divergent views of the learned single Judge on one hand and of the Division Bench on the other, the learned single Judge was of the prima facie view that the judgment of 1991 may be a good law. But, as there is a Division Bench judgment to the contra, the learned single Judge has referred the matter to the Division Bench and the Division Bench because of the conflict, thought it fit to refer to the Bench of a larger strength for resolving the conflict. May be, both the learned single Judge and the Division Bench were of the view that Section 16 of Civil Courts Act lays down the criteria for valuation of the suit and that Section 50(1) of the Court Fees Act being general and is subject to any specific provision made to the contrary, the market value of the property is the criterion and not the value of the suit made for the payment of the Court-fees.