P G ANANTASAYANAM Vs. MIRIYALA SATHIRAJU

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioners herein challenge the order passed by the learned Special Officer-cum-Principal District Munsif, Kakinada and confirmed by the learned District Judge, Kakinada in A.T.A.No.25 of 1994. The facts giving rise to the present writ petition may be stated in brief. The petitioners are landlords. In the proceedings pending before the Trial Court the Court granted permission to the tenant/respondent to summon advocate, who had issued a reply notice on behalf of the petitioner No.1's father on the ground that it was necessary to prove the said notice and that the copy of the said notice was lost. The application was opposed by the father of petitioner No. 1 on the ground that summoning the advocate for proving the notice sent on behalf of the client, was not permissible under Section 126 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). Section 126 of the Act is as follows : "No barrister, attorney, pleader of vakil shall at any time be permitted, unless with his client's express consent, to disclose any communication made to him in the course and for the purpose of his employment as such barrister, pleader, attorney or vakil, by or on behalf of his client, or to state the contents or condition of any document with which he has become acquainted in the course and for the purpose of his professional employment, or to disclose any advice given by him to his client in the course and for the purpose of such employment

(2.) The objection was overruled by the learned Principal District Munsif as well as by the Appellate Court.

(3.) Having heard the learned Counsel for the petitioners, I find that the objection is totally meritless. Section 126 of the Act does not come into play in a case like this. The purpose of summoning the advocate is not to disclose any confidential communication made by the client to his advocate. The purpose is only to prove sending of the notice which was sent by the advocate on the information supplied by the client. The very purpose of sending notice is to communicate the contents to the otherside. There is nothing confidential in nature in the contents of the notice. There is abundant authority for stating that the Section 126 of the Act is not meant to forbid the disclosure of any feet which was already known or disclosed. A precisely same question came before tliis Court in P. Rajamma v. P. Chintaiah, 1997 (2) An.W.R. 253. It was held by this Court that summoning of advocate cannot be challenged on the ground that it contravenes Section 126 of the Act. Again in Rev.Fr.Bernad Thattil v. Ramachandra Pillai, 1987 CrLL.J. 739, the same question arose and it was pointed out that whatever was written or was stated in the notice was evidently the substance which was meant for being disclosed to others and more particularly to the other side. There was nothing confidential in the contents of the notice which in fact has been communicated to the other side. The contents were no more confidential so as to claim privilege under Section 126 of the Act. Of course summoning of the advocate for purposes of proof of sending of the notice will not justify asking of questions which would fall within the mischief of Section 126 of the Act. If questions the answers of which would enable the advocate to claim privilege under Section 126 of the Act, are put, it would be open to claim such privilege for such questions. The purpose for which the present summons has been issued is only to prove the sending of the notice, the contents of which are in no way confidential at all. In the circumstances, the revision-petition is meritless and is dismissed. No costs.