AMATI HYMAVATHI Vs. NISSANKARARAO SRIKRISHNAMURTHY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These cases can be styled as "child death compensation cases" involving common - questions of law and facts. They have been heard together and being disposed of with this common judgment. Apart from each case presenting-different considerations to assess the compensation, they involve a common simple but very important question, namely, how to assess the compensation in motor accident infant or child death cases. The plethora of precedents prevailing on the question have failed to provide consistency or the uniform guidelines for the Tribunals and the Courts to approach the matter with certainty or with absolute confidence. Therefore, in the nature of the arguments advanced by the learned advocates who are appearing in the batch of cases, namely, Sarvasri S. Hanumaiah, Prattipati Venkateswarlu, N. Subba Rao, M. Chandrasekhar Reddy, T. Bheemsen, K. Subba Rao, V. Tulasi Reddy, M. Ramaiah, C. Prabhakar Reddy, P. Sri Raghuram, O. Manohar Reddy, Y. V. Swamy, S. Prabhakr Reddy, S.V.R. Somayajulu, and A.T.M. Rangaramanujam and in view of certain complexities projecting from the situation to leave and finality of the views on the question or questions involved by removing certain doubts. Mr. Srinivasa Rao, the learned senior advocate has been prevailed upon to assist the Court as an amicus curias in addition to the valuable guidance given by the learned advocates for the petitioners. It is almost the four decades of the precedents and the comparable cases which are available to leave a background in deciding such a question.

(2.) We arc dealing with the fate of the survivors on the fete of the dead. The claim petitions are filed for compensation for the death of children. There cannot be any difference in the result of death as every mortal will meet the life with death. Therefore, in law and experience, the result of death is similar. The consequences of death are also on the survivors to suffer the separation or the sadness is also not different. But the degree of agony and the loss of the consequences may vary in certain situations. Therefore, to that extent, the death claim cases involving the death of the children may not be different from other claim cases of death. But, in law and facts and experience, the differentiation has a role to play for the Courts or the Tribunals to decide properly and in accordance with law and to achieve the ultimate justice which is popularly called Human law and Human justice. This is the back drop of the theme of the judgment which concerns the Court to deal with the matters with all seriousness and concern. There is no restitutio in integrum to award the compensation for the death of a child or anybody in money value as it is difficult to reimburse the life. However, the Law of Torts evolved a legal fiction that such loss of life can be compensated in money value, because "to compensate in money for pain and for physical consequences is invariably difficult but no other process can be devised than that of making a monetary assessment." (See page 2 of 'Damages for Personal Injuries and Death' by John Munkman, Seventh Edition, 1985, London, Butterworths).

(3.) Technically speaking, the law of compensation or damages has a root in the Law of Torts. Atleast in India, there was no statutory basis to assess the compensation in such claims for the negligence of others till the Indian Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 was enacted to come on the Statute Book on 27th March, 1855 (Act 13 of 1855). Therefore, the first law was born almost one and half centuries ago in relation to awarding of compensation in fatal accident cases. The next condification of law relating to awarding compensation for motor vehicle accidents is the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Act No. 4 of 1939) which came into force on 16/02/1939 and the latest one is the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (Act No. LIX of 1988), which came into force on 1-7-1989. The 1988 Act has also undergone amendment by the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1994 (Act No. 54 of 1994) which came into force with effect from 14-11-1994. Therefore, the root of law for compensation fundamental in Law of Torts has sought codification in the three enactments stated above. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 has been repealed by the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. But, interestingly and usefully the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 is still on statute book and not repealed. Both Sections 135 of 1939 Act and 217 of 1988 Act are silent about it. The reason being that none of the provisions of 1939 Act or 1988 Act deal with the question as how to award compensation in motor accident cases except broadly declaring that the Tribunals or the Courts will award compensation which is 'just and reasonable'. It is also interesting to note that there is no similar statute like the Fatal Accidents Act for personal injury claim cases. Therefore, it is fundamental to remember that even now, barring the precedents on the subject, it is the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 which should primarily and really regulate the awarding of the damages or compensation regarding the fatal accident claim cases. Under Section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act, a suit for compensation lies to the family of a person for loss occasioned to it by his or her death by actionable wrong. Such an action or suit shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child, if any, of the person whose death shall have been so caused. It is only because of the relevant provisions in Act, 1939 and the Act, 1988, such suits arc barred. Therefore, the analogy is that although suits contemplated under Section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 are barred to be filed in a Civil Court, the law in relation to that to be dealt with before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals constituted under Section 110 of the Act, 1939 or under Section 165 of the 1988 Act, as the case may be, cannot be forgotten. The scope of Section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act is also enlarged that not only the persons mentioned in the provision can maintain such proceedings or actions but also any other legal heir and the dependants of the deceased can maintain such action. Therefore, wherever the word "Court'' is used under the provisions of Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, it may be substituted with the word "Tribunal" or the "Court" if it is the appellate Court, as the case may be. Similarly, the expression "suit" used in such provisions may also have to be substituted with the word "application" for compensation. Barring mat, there may not be difference in the operation of the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act in relation to the fatal accident claim cases. This Court also feels that the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act should be read with the relevant provisions of the 1939 Act and also the 1988 Act, while determining the compensation. But, it need not be over emphasised that the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 or the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 being the latter and latest enactments, to the extent of any inconsistency with the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, should override the former enactment.