GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH Vs. D KANAKAMMA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) All these appeals have arisen from a judgment by Neeladri Rao, J., in which judgment he has stated about the powers of the appellate authority to pass such order as it may think fit in appeal against an order passed under sub-sections 2-A and 2-D of Section 44 in Chapter VII of the A.P. Forest Act, 1967 and the Rules framed thereunder. Learned Single Judge has taken the view that by the use of the word 'compounding fee' the appellate authority has actually not exercised the power under Sec. 59 of the A.P. Forest Act, that Sec. 44 (2-E) is of wide amplitude and the appellate authority is empowered not only to confirm or annul the order of confiscation but can either order or issue further directions and even assuming that the order intended to enter into the area covered by Sec. 59 of the A.P. Forest Act, the case or cases before him were not such that he would have exercised his discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution and interfere with the directions of the appellate authority. There appears, however, some conflict with the view expressed by the learned single Judge with the view expressed by a Bench of this Court in Divisional forest Officer vs. Laxman Pratap Ray. There is, however, good reason to think that, in case the confiscation is not held to be a proper order on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the appellate authority which is empowered to pass such order as it may think fit may extend to an order by the appellate authority to take steps under Section 59 of the A.P. Forest Act. We express, however, no opinion on that as any attempt by a Bench of co-ordinate jurisdiction to differ with the view expressed by the said judgment of the Division Bench may not be advisible. Let these appeals accordingly be placed for hearing before a Full Bench. These writ appeals coming on for final hearing before the Full Bench pursuant to the orders of reference of the Division Bench dated 19-3-1996 and upon hearing the arguments of the Counsel appearing on behalf of the parties the Court delivered the following common These Writ Appeals arise out of a common judgment of the learned single Judge rendered in a batch of writ petitions wherein the learned Judge upheld the orders passed by the District Judges on the appeals presented to them under sub-section (2-E) of Section 44 of the A.P. Forest Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The appeals were preferred by the persons whose vehicles (Lorries) were confiscated by the Authorised Officer in exercise of power under sub-section (2-A) of Section 44 together with the timber/forest produce which the vehicles were carrying, on the ground that forest offences were committed in respect thereof.

(2.) On appeal under sub-section (2-E) of Section. 44 of the Act, the District Judges set aside the orders of confiscation of vehicles subject to the condition of the petitioners paying within the stipulated period a sum of money equivalent to the value of the illicit timber seized or double the value thereof as 'compounding fee'. The confiscation order as regards the timber was, however, confirmed and we are not concerned with that aspect.

(3.) Contending that the power to direct release of vehicle on payment of 'compounding fee' is not vested with the appellate Court and attacking the finding of the appellate Court in some cases regarding the absence of knowledge on the part of vehicle owner, Writ Petitions were filed by the State Government against the orders passed by the Addl. District Judge, Khammam and others. Amongst the grounds urged in W.P.No. 15862 of 1990 (which is the subject-matter of Writ Appeal No. 1453/95), the following ground may be noticed:- "In any event, the second respondent (ADJ) oughtnot to have compounded the case. Instead, the 2nd respondent should have remanded the matter to the Authorised Officer to consider the case under Sec. 59 of the Act." The same contention is also reiterated before us in these writ appeals. In raising this contention, the appellant-State placed reliance on the decision of Division Bench of this Court in Divisional Forest Officer vs. Laxman Pratap Ray which was also referred to by the learned single Judge. The details of that decision we shall advert to later. For the present, suffice it to note that at the time the appellate Courts passed the orders, that Judgment was not rendered. It is only during the pendency of the writ Petitions that the Division Bench handed down its ruling on several important aspects concerning the interpretation of compounding provisions. Inter alia, the Division Bench ruled that the District Court has no power to direct compounding and payment of certain sum of money as compounding-fee. The learned single Judge took the view that the appellate Court passed the impugned order by way of modifying the order of confiscation 'but not by way of compounding'. Being conscious of the fact that the appellate Judge himself used the expression 'compounding', the learned single Judge took the view that in substance, it was not really a case of compounding, but it was a case in which the compounding fee prescribed under the Act was taken as a measure for fixing the sum directed to be paid in lieu of confiscation. To reach the conclusion which he did, the learned Judge took note of the power confided to the appellate Court to "pass such order as it may think fit". It is on this reasoning that the orders of appellate Court were upheld in the writ petitions. Aggrieved by the judgment of the learned single Judge, the present Writ Appeals are filed by the State.