K RAMULU Vs. STATE OF A P

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The appellant in this case was the original owner of 20 acres of land situated at Sadasivpet. Out of these 20 acres, 10 acres were acquired from the petitioner by the State for public purpose in the year 1958 for establishing a seed- firm. A few years thereafter in March 1976 another Ac 3-30 guntas were acquired from this land belonging to the petitioner for the purpose of providing house sites to harijans. He also says that three acres were under forcible occupation of third parties and that he has been left with only Ac.2.15 guntas in S.No.393 which is now sought to be acquired by a notification published by the Collector Medak District u/s 4 of the Land Acquisition Act dt. 4-10-76. The purpose of acquisition is to provide house sites to Harijans. On the same day, sec.5 (A) enquiry has been dispensed with exercising powers u/s 17(4). But nothing further has happened till the petitioner received notices u/ss 9(1) and 10 of the Land Acquisition Act on 26-6-77. It is against the above notification made u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act this writ petition has been filed.

(2.) Although this matter raises a serious question as to the constitutionality of the action of the Collector in acquiring the land from the same party for public purpose repea- tedly, the Collector had not filed any counter either in the writ petitioner or in this writ appeal. Nor did any other person who is a party to the writ petition file an affidavit. Thus the learned Single Judge has not got any material before him contradicting the statements made by the petitioner in his petition. His assertions that he was still in possession of this land of ac.2.15 guntas and that he had been reduced to the state of a small farmer with repeated acquisitions of his land made by the State remained uncontradicted. However the learned judge was dismissed the writ petition without adverting to the only constitutional issue of Article 14 that arises in this case by holding that possession of the lands was taken by the Government on 18-5-79. In the absence of the Collector filing any counter affidavit or any other person who is a party to the writ petition filing any counter affidavit to that effect, we hold that that finding of the learned judge is vitiated for want of evidentiary support. We are told that the learned judge took note of a statement contained in an affidavit filed by a third partyi who unsuccessfully attempted to implead himself in the wirit petition. In that affidavit of the third party it was alleged that Government took possession of the lands on 18-5-79. But that application had been dismissed by this court. The utility and the usefulness of those allegations contained in the affidavit in support of the impleading petition should be held to have ended with the termination of that application. Even that affidavit did not deny the repeated acquisitions. The result is, the allegations which are vital for the decision of the constitutional question and which are made by the petitioner remain uncontradicted.

(3.) We proceed on the basis that the petitioner's land has been acquired repeatedly for public purpose and the petitioner's ownership has been reduced from 20 acres to ac.2.15 guntas. We hold the mere taking of possession is not dettering factor for issuing a writ. The question is whether the State action in these circumstances would be justified in acquiring those lands. We hold that the State in subjecting one particular person's property to repeated acquisitions is acting contrary to Article 14 of the Constitution. By resorting to such acquisitions the State is imposing the social burdens of Land Acquisition Act on selected individuals and is thereby violating the equality rule of Art.14. It should have been better known that power of eminent domain is inherently an unjust power and the reasons whose duty it is to administer such law must administer it taking care to distribute its burdens equally well on all. (See 1981-I-A.L.T.106(F.B.). It follows that in any land acquisition case and more particularly in a case like this it becomes the duty of the Government to explain the unavoidable necessity of acquiring a particular piece of land from the. same person by showing that there were no other lands available for acquisition, either private or public.In the absence of such an allegation and proof by the Government, we hold that the Collector had acted unconstitutionally and even without any consideration for the fate of the owner of a small extent of land. The State power cannot be allowed to be used monstruously by these small officials even for glorified purposes contrary to Art.14. The fact that this land is being acquired for housing the Harijans is wholly irrelevant so far as the complaint of the petitioner under article 14 is concerned. The law does not permit a small farmer to be ruined in the name of accommodating a poor Harijan. The end of providing house sites to Harijans may be right and laudable but it is an elementary rule of the Constitution that means adopted to achieve such an end must also be right. Unless it is shown that house sites cannot be made available to harijans except by acquiring these ac.2.15 guntas of land from the petitioner, the State shall not be permitted to go on with these acquisition. As that was not done, sec.4(1) notification has to be set aside. In the circumstances we see no justification whatsoever in State issuing the said section 4(1) Notification. It is accordingly set aside. We direct the property to restored back to the petitioner, even in case the Government has taken possession of the land, within one week from the date of receipt of this order.