N ANANTHA CHARY Vs. HANUMAN TEMPLE COMMITTEE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Appellants-defendants 2 and 3 filed an application under Section 38 of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act (Act 17 of 1966), for short, "the Aet to register Hanuman Temple, Ganesh Temple, Shriram Temple and Navagraba Temple situated at Devatown Bazar, Bolarum, as religious institutions and that they and the first defendant to be heriditary trustees. The Assistant had registered the institutions under Section 38 but accorded no to them as heriditary trustees, relegating them to an enquiry under Section 77 of the Act. Pursuant thereof, they filed the application under Section 77 (1) (c) before the Deputy Commissioner, who conducted the enquiry and found that the appellants1 have not adduced any acceptable evidence to show that they are the heriditary trustees; they have been rendering Archakatwam service for generations ; there is no contra evidence and accordingly declared them to be heriditary trustees and Archakas. Assailing the legality thereof, the first respondent-Hanuman Temple Committee filed O.S.No. 133/78 in the Court of the Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. The learned Chief Judge has held that the appellants have not established that they are the heriditary trustees; on the other hand the evidence adduced clearly establishes that the Committee had been in management of the temple right from 1917 till date of order and accordingly he declared that the appellants are not the heriditary trustees and set aside the order of the Deupty Commissioner passed under Section 77. Assailing the legality thereof, the appeal has been filed.

(2.) It is now an undisputed fact that the temples were constructed by the devotees and were under no managment of the appellants. The second appellant, as D.W.I, has admitted that they are not maintaining any record to show that they are making any collections from the houses attached to the temples. The only question, therefore, is whether the appellents are heriditary trustees. Sri N.C.V. Ramanujachari, learned counsel for the appellants contents that under Section 78, the "person aggrieved" against the oredr passed by the Deputy Commissioner under Section 77 alone is entitled Jo lay the suit; the Committee represented by Sri K. Krishna Reddy is not a "person aggrieved", therefore, the suit is not maintainable. Sec.78 postulates that " any person aggrieved by the decision of the Deputy Commissioner under Section 77" may, within one year from the date of publication of the decision, institute a suit in the District Court. Therefore the question is what is the meaning of the term "any person aggrieved by the decision?" Section 77 provides the power to the Deputy Commissioner to decide certain disputes and the method of conducting enquiry is dealt with in Chapter XII of the Act. Section 77 (1) (c) postulates whether the trusteeship is heriditary or not and it enjoins the Deputy Commissioner to decide the dispute as to that question and any person aggrieved of the decision given by the Deputy Commissioner; the right of a suit is provided under Section 78. The first respondent-Committee is a registered Chmmittee comprises of devotees of the subject temples. Under those circumstances: the Committee has got insignia of a registered body and the members are the devotees and residents of the locality. Section 78 does not define the person that would participate in the enquiry before the Deputy Commissiener, Nor it expressly says that he who participates under Sec. 77 alone is entitled to lay the suit assailing the legality of the decision rendered by the Deputy Commissioner. Therefore, any person interested in the dispute is entited to lay the suit. The question then is whether a Registered Committee is aggrieved against the decision given by the Deputy Commissioner. They are religious institutions built in with the munificient contributions by the devotees. There is no deed of endowment. The attached homes are subsequent gift over. It is not the appellants case that either the houses belong to them or their ancestors established the temples. Therefore, every devotee is entitled to rightful management of the Institutions. The claim of the heriditary trusteeship implies thereunder a right to management of the temple. Therefore, when the appellants are claiming heriditary trusteeship unhedged with deed of endowment, every devotee is entitled to dispute the status of the persons claiming to be heriditary trustee. Under those circumstances, I have least hesitation to conclude that the first respondent, Committee is "a person aggrieved" within the meaning of Section 78 of the Act and it is entitled to lay the suit against the decision of the Deputy Commissioner made under Section 77 of the Act.3 A

(3.) It is next contended that the suit is barred by limitation. The decision under Section 77 was given on April 17, 1976, but the suit was laid on July 26,1978. No doubt, by arithmetical calculation, the suit is barred by limitation. But the question is when the limitation begins to run and on what date the appellants had the notice of the order passed under Sec. 77 Section78 enjoins that a "suit shall be iostituted within one yearffora the date of publication of the decision by the Deputy Commissioner", For the limitation to begin to run, publication of the decision by the Deputy Commissioner is a condition precedent. Until then the limitation does not start running It is now found as a fact and not disputed that it was not published. The Committee was not impleaded in the enquiry bafore the Deputy Commissioner. Therefore, the limitation begins to run only froin the date of knowledge. It is stated and also substantiated by the evidence of P.W.I that they came to know of the decision or the Deputy Commissioner on July 17,1978 pursuant to tx. A-3 notice dated July 7,1978 served oa them on July 17, 1978. Therefore, the limitation began to run from that date. Admittedly the suit was filed on July 23, 1978. The suit, therefore, is well within limitation.