SWADESHI KHANDASARI UDYOG Vs. STATE OF A P

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE seven tax revision cases can be disposed of by a common order. For the sake of convenience, we may state the facts in T. R. C. No. 43 of 1985 since all the material facts are identical, though the dates of orders may vary from case to case.

(2.) THE assessment year concerned is 1972-73. The original assessment was made on 19th September, 1973. The turnover relating to jaggery was taxed but at a lower rate. The assessment order is said to have been served upon the assessee on 24th December, 1973. Finding later that jaggery has been taxed at a lower rate than prescribed by law, the assessing authority reopened the assessment and passed a revised order of assessment on 23rd September, 1978. Against this order, appeals were filed but without success. The matter was then brought to this Court, in T. R. C. No. 42 of 1982, etc. One of the contentions urged before this Court was that the order of reassessment was barred by limitation. It was contended that on the facts of the case and also because there was no failure on the part of the assessee to disclose the turnover or any other particulars correctly, the four year period of limitation applies and not the six year period. Since the reassessment was made in this case beyond four year period (though within six years), it was contended, the order of assessment is barred by limitation. This contention was entertained by this Court on that occasion. But it was observed :

(3.) WE do not, however, think it necessary to examine the said contention on merits, since we are not inclined to allow the petitioners to raise this contention. This contention was not raised on the earlier occasion before this Court. Had this contention been raised, the very remand would have been unnecessary. The only contention then urged was that it is the four year period that applies and not the six year period. The remand therefore, must accordingly be construed as confined to that question. In any event, even before the Tribunal, the only contention urged was that the four year period applied and not the six year period on the facts of the case. This the Tribunal discussed and on merits found that it is the six year period that applies. If we now allow the petitioners to raise this new contention, the very order of this Court remanding the matter becomes superfluous and meaningless. We cannot, therefore, allow the petitioners to raise a new contention. It is true that the contention raised now also one of limitation. But the basis upon which it is raised is altogether new and as stated above, allowing it to be raised at this stage would make both the order of remand of this Court in T. R. C. No. 42 of 1982 and batch as also the judgment of the Tribunal meaningless and superfluous.