SIRAJUNNISA BEGUM Vs. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Judgment of the Bench delivered by the Hon'ble Mr. Justice P.A. ChoudaryThe petitioners are owners of excess vacant land measuring 26, 025. 98 sq.mts. in T.S.No. 15 (part) and situate in Bhaktavarguda, Golconda. That piece of land falls under the Hyderabad Urban Agglomeration. Under the provisions of the URBAN LAND (CEILING AND REGULATION) ACT, 1976 such vacant lands are to be identified for purpose of being acquired by the State. The competent authority under the Act had to compute first and notify later the excess vacant land which is so liable to be acquired by the Government. There is a long drawn out procedure prescribed by the Act for the making of such notification. Among those provisions relating to making of such notifications Section 10 is the last and the final provision. It provides for final determination of excess vacant land. Under the said section, the competent authority would publish a notification in the official gazette declaring excess vacant land that would be deemed to have been acquired by the State Government. In this case such a notification was published on 6-4-1983. But under Section 20 (1) (a) the owner of excess vacant land has a right to apply to the Government for exempting his land from the provisions of the Act. Section 20 (1) (a) reads thus . Section 20. Power to exempt: (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any of the foregoing provisions of the Chapter (a) where any person holds vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit and the State Government is satisfied, either on its own motion or otherwise, that, having regard to the location of such land, the purpose for which such land is being or is proposed to be used and such other relevant factors as the circumstances of the case may require, it is necessary or expedient in the public interest so to do, that Government may, by order, exempt, subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the order, such vacant land from the provisions of this chapter :

(2.) Subsequent to the above notification made under Section 10 (3), on 11-5-83 the petitioners who are the owners had applied to the State Government under Section 20 (1) (a) of the Urban Land Ceiling Act for grant of exemption of that excess land from the purview of the Act. Although Section 20 (1) (a) provides for making of such applications by any person holding excess vacant land for exemption, the Government by its order dated 11-1-1983, held that the owners' application was belated. It rejected the application of the petitioners-owners on the ground that by the date of owners' application on 11-5-1983 they had ceased to be the owners of excess vacant land. The land had ceased to be the property of the owners and had become the property of the Government, the Government asserted. On that premise the Government held that Section 20 (1) (a) had no application and the question of Government exempting its own land from the purview of the Act could not arise. All this led to the refusal of exemption by the Government to the owners. The petitioners challange that order of the Government refusing exemption. The question in this case is what meaning and scope should be given to the exemption power of the Government under Section 20 (1) (a) of the Act.

(3.) Acceptably to the tenor of the language of the above mentioned notification published under Section 10 (3) the excess vacant land should be deemed to have been acquired by the State Government by reason of such notification under Section 10 (3) of the Act and that upon the publication of such a notification the said land should be deemed to have been vested absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances. If the land was vested in the Government by reason of Section 10(3) notification, it may be conceded in argument that the question of granting exemption by the Government of its own land could not have arisen. After all, Section 20 (1) (a) postulates the continuance of a situation where the ownership of the excess vacant land still inheres in the owner. The conclusion of the Government that Section 20 (1) (a) was unavailable to the petitioners and inapplicable to the facts of this case was based on the assumption that the excess vacant land had ceased to belong to the owners by the date of application. If that were to be the meaning which we should give to Section 10 (3) as the Government contends then the consequence would be to reduce Section 20 (1) (a) of the Act from the status of an enacting clause to the postition of a dead letter. The present writ petition has been filed by the owners of the land, questioning the order of the Government that assigned such a meaning to the Act. The question in practical terms is when should an application under Section 20 (1) (a) should be made by the owner seeking exemption to his excess vacant land and could that be made even after Section 10 (3) notification was published by the Government.