VEDPRAKASH Vs. OSMANIA UNIVERSITY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner was initially appointed as a lecturer in Hindi in the year 1970 and obtained post graduation and also Doctorate and has put in five years of service as a lecturer. He has to his credit research experience. In Advertisement No. 5 of 1983, applications have been invited from the qualifying candidates for appointment to the posts of Readers. In Hindi, one post was advertised for appointment. The qualifications prescribed are good academic record with Doctoral Degree or equivalent published work (Evidence is being actively engaged in (i) research or (ii) innovation of teaching methods or (iii) production of teaching materials); about live years experience of teaching and/or research provided that at least three of these years were as lecturer or in an equivalent position. This condition may be relaxed in the case of candidates with outstanding research work, Condition No. 3 of General Conditions provides that 14%, 4% and 25% reservations are made for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes respectively in case of Readers and Lecturers only. Subsequently interviews have been conducted on Nov. 28, 1983. The petitioner and one Dr. Indu Vasisth and Respondents 2 and 3, viz., Dr. I. Mohan Singh and Dr. B. Satyanarayana were selected by the Committee constituted under Sec. 39 (2) of the Osmania University Act. The Syndicate has approved their selection in its resolution No. 333, dated Jan. 9, 1984 for appointment of petitioner and Respondents 2 and 3 as Readers. The University has appointed Respondents 2 and 3. Assailing the legality thereof, the writ petition has been filed.

(2.) The contention of Sri Seshachari, learned counsel for the petitioner runs thus : Only one pest was advertised for appointment as a Reader. The appointment of respondents 2 and 3 is contrary to the advertisement I find no substance in this contention. It is stated in the counter that by the time the selections could be made, there arose two vacancies reserved for Scheduled Caste and Backward Class (Group D). The 2nd respondent is Backward C)ass-D and the 3rd respondent is Scheduled Caste. Therefore they have been appointed in the order of roaster; thereby though there was an advertisement only for one post, those two persons were appointed. It is further stated that in the year 1983, there arose seven vacancies for the posts of Reader. Six are reserved for open candidates and one was reserved for Backward Class candidate. By then (here exists one carry forward post reserved for Scheduled Caste. Thereby when the advertisement is made though for one post, obviously it must be considered for the Scheduled Caste and Backward Class candidates and accordingly the 3rd and 2nd respondents were selected to those posts and were appointed. In the year 1984 there were as many as 37 vacancies. Out of them 28 were reserved for open candidates, 2 for Scheduled Caste candidates and 7 for Backward Class Candidates. By 1984 adding two carried forward posts to the Scheduled Castes, it comes to three posts. As per the roaster to be maintained as on date when the appointments were made there was a short fall of one candidate belonging to Backward Class. The 2nd respondent since happened to be a Backward Class-D group and the post fell reserved for them, he has been selected by the Committee and was appointed. Therefore, the appointments are perfectly valid and legal.

(3.) It is next contended that the advertisement is made only for one post. The appointment without advertisement of another post cannot be made and that therefore, the appointments are illegal. I find no force in this regard also. When there is short fall of the reserved vacancies and the system of carry forward is adapted and at the selection the candidates to whom the posts stood reserved are available and were selected by the duly constituted committee, the appointments cannot be said to be illegal. If it were a case where the posts were meant for recruitment to the open candidates without advertisement, perhaps there may be some justification to raise the contention because the eligible persons who are otherwise entitled to apply for selection cannot be deprived of their right to consideration for appointment. But that question does not arise on the facts of this case.