G RANGANAYAKULU Vs. M SATYANARAYANA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Mr. P. A. Choudary learned Counsel for the appellant (4th respondent in the writ petition), raised two contentions : (1) that this Court could interfere in an application filed under Article 226 of the Constitution for the issuance of a writ of certiorari only on two grounds: (i) want of jurisdiction of the lower authority, and (ii) error apparent on the face of record and (2) that the learned single Judge tailed to see that the Board of Revenue the second appellate authority, had all the powers of the original authority (the appointing authority) and that in exercise of their powers it had in effect granted exemption to the appellant in accordance with the requirements of rule 13 of the Andhra Pradesh Village Offices Service Rules hereinafter referred to as the Rules'.

(2.) To appreciate ths points raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant the relevant facts may be set out The Office of Village Munsif of Krishnunipalem. Rajahmundry Taluk, East Goda- vari District, fell vacant and applications were invited under the directions of the Sub-Collector, Rajahmundry by the Tahsildar for filling up that post The proceedings inviting the applications were dated 29th February, 1972. At that time, the post proposed 'to be filled up was only temporary as the permanent incumbent was on sick leave Only one application was submitted and that was that of the appellant Subsequently, the permanent village munsif died on 26th September 1972 with the result that the Tahsildar issued a second notification on 30th April, 1973 for filling up that post on a permanent basis. In response to that notice, there were only two applications, one from tshe appellant and the other from the 1st respondent. The 1st respondent was preferred to that post by the Revenue Divisonal Officer even though the appellant was acting temporarily during the period of leave of the permanent village munsif. That order appointing the 1st respondent was carried in appeal to the District Revenue Officer who saw no reason to interfere with the order of the Sub-Collector. That led to the appellant filing a second appeal under rule 61, of the Rules before the Board of Revenue. The Board of Revenue reversed the order of the lower authority and appointed the appellant to the vacant post of village munsif of Krishnunipalem. The 1st respondent then moved this Court for a writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution and our learned brother Ramachandra Rao, J., quashed the order of the Board of Revenue and restored the order of the District Revenue Officer confirming the order of the Sub-Collector, Rajahmundry.

(3.) It is not in dispute that at the date of the first notification calling for applications or at the date of the second notification calling for applications, the appellant was not qualified. The only qualification he had was that he had previous experience as a village munsif of that village having acted in the leave vacancy of the permanent incumbent. Rule 10 prescribes certain qualifications for appointment to the post of a village officer. This rule categorically lays down that the qualifications of a candidate for appointment to the post of a village officer shall be determined with reference to the date of issue of the notice inviting applications. The notice has been published in accordance with the requirements of section 10, and that is not in dispute. Admittedly, the appellant did not possess the qualifications required for appointment to the post of village munsif at the date of the publication of either of the notices. Rule 10 (3) (if) prescribes further qualifications. The further qualifications prescribed for village officers are : (a) a pass in Village Officers' Special Test in Village Manual of Accounts (6) a pass in a test on the powers and duties of village officers, and (c) a pass in a test on the Survey for Revenue purposes. What Mr. Choudary contends is that rule 13 provides for granting exemption of these Special qualifications and, as observed by the Board of Revenue, the appointing authority should have granted the appellant exemption having chosen him for appointment on a temporary basis. Rule 13 may, therefore, be read: "13. Appointment of persons who do not possess the qualifications for special reasons.- The appointing authority may, for special reasons to be recorded in writing, appoint any person not possessing the qualifications specified in clause (ii) of subrule (3) of rule 10 as Village Officer if he considers such persons otherwise suitable for such appointment, subject to the condition that the person so appointed shall acquire the necessary qualifications within a reasonable time not exceeding three years and if such person fails to acquire the qualifications within the time specified he shall be discharged. What Mr. Choudary, contends is that a reading of the order of the Board of Revenue, would make it clear that the Board intended that such an exemption should have been granted and it had in effect, by virtue of its appellate power under rule 61, granted such exemption to the appellant. We are unable to agree with Mr. Choudary that the order of the Board of Revenue, however carefully it may be read, indicates even remotely that it granted exemption to the appellant subject to the condition that he shall qualify himself within a period not exceeding three years. Apart from there being no such indication in ths order of the Board of Revenue, we would like to make it clear that rule 13 is not susceptible to such an interpretation. Rule 13 specifically empowers the "appointing authority" to grant exemption and that too for special reasons to be recorded in writing. It is a power specifically ested in the appointing authority nd not in any other authority. The appellate authority or the second ppellate authority has, no doubt, the powers or the jurisdiction to grant all the reliefs which the first or the original authority may grant. If it was the intention of the rule- making authority that the appellate or the second appellate authority or the revisional authority should also possess the power to grant exemption, then a provision would have been made to that effect in rule 13 or in any other Rule. When the Rules specifically lay down that the "appointing authority" for special reasons to be recorded in writing, may appoint a person who does not possess the qualifications specified in rule 10 (3) (ii) subject to his qualifying later, no other authority can exercise that power. It is also to be noted that it is not obligatory on the appointing authority to exercise the power vested in him under rule 13. It is a discretionary power which he may or may not exercise having regard to administrative expediency. If no other candidate is available and there is only one candidate and if it is not possible to find qualified candidates without undue delay, it would be open to the appointing authority, for special reasons to be recorded in writing to appoint any unqualified person to the post of village munsif giving him sufficient time not exceeding three years to qualify himself. When no such exemption is granted to a candidate, it goes without saying that rule 10 (3) (ii) is mandatary and will not be open to the appointing authority to consider the application of the candidate who had not passed the tests laid down for the village officers. The Board of Revenue seems to have been under an erroneous mpression that the appellant was qualified to be considered for the reason that he acted earlier or for the reason that the appointing authority could have exercised that jurisdiction. It is purely within the jurisdiction of the appointing authority to act under rule 13. All that the superior authority may do in exercise of its appellate or revisional jurisdiction is to direct the appointing authority to consider in a proper case the question of granting exemption. But, it is ultimately for the appointing authority to determine in a given case whether he should grant, for special reasons to be recorded in writing exemption or not. When a person is not even qualified for appointment either at the date of the first notification or at the date of the second notification it cannot be said that no error apparent on the face of the record was committed by the Board of Revenue in interfering with the orders of the lower revenue authority The Board has jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal; but it has to be exercised in accordance with the rules. It is not a case where the Board of Revenue differed from the lower authorities in interpreting any particular rule, but it is a case where it ignored the mandatory requirements of rule 10. There is also error of jurisdiction as the Board of Revenue proceeded on the basis of the first notification when, by the second notification the first notification was superseded. Further, the Board had not chosen to consider the claims of the 1st respondent at all We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the order of the learned single Judge. The writ appeal fails and it is accordingly dismissed. No costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 150.00. Writ appeal dismissed.