(1.) The petitioner is a licensee of a private warehouse under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. He has his warehouse in the village of Kommur in Guntur District. The Deputy Superintendent of Central Excise visited the petitioner?s warehouse on 12-1-1965 and verified the consignments of tobacco in the presence of the petitioner and a Trade Panel specially constituted at the request of the petitioner. The Deputy Superintendent noticed that I.A.C. processed choora tobacco, which ought to be present in the warehouse, was missing and in its place there was V.F.C. Tobacco. Heavy duty in a sum of Rs. 28,000/- and odd is payable on the I.A.C. tobacco. No duty was payable on the V.F.C. tobacco. In the light of the other record pertaining to the tobacco that ought to be in the warehouse of the petitioner on 12-1-1965, the Deputy Collector of Central Excise issued a notice to the petitioner asking him to show cause as to why he should not impose on the petitioner a penalty and also demand duty of Rs. 28,000/- and odd. The petitioner contended that he received only V.F.C. tobacco and that, therefore, he was not bound that to pay any duty or penalty. The Deputy Collector of Central Excise found that the petitioner actually received I.A.C. processed choora tobacco and that he substituted the same with V.F.C. tobacco only to avoid the payment of duty. Accordingly, he directed the petitioner to pay the duty of Rs. 28,015-08 ps. and imposed a penalty of Rs. 750/-. The petitioner preferred an appeal before the Collector, Central Excise (Second respondent). That appeal was dismissed, however, with a modification of the penalty. Instead of Rs. 750/- the Collector of Excise directed the petitioner to pay a penalty of Rs. 300/- only. The petitioner thereupon preferred a revision to the Central Government. That revision was also dismissed.
(2.) Sri P.L.N. Sarma, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, contends that the petitioner did not commit any offence under Rule 151(d) of the Central Excise Rules and that, therefore, the demand of duty and imposition of penalty are unjustified. Rule 151(d) provides that if the owner of goods warehoused, or the warehouse-keeper connivance privately removes or conceals any goods either before or after they are warehoused, he shall be liable to pay a penalty which may extend to two thousand rupees and all goods warehoused, removed, or concealed in contravention of the rule shall be liable to confiscation. Laying stress on the word ?warehoused? removed, in the beginning of Rule 151, Sri Sarma contends at considerable length that clause (d) is not applicable to goods already warehoused. I am unable to accept this contention. The goods already warehoused. The word ?warehoused? in the first limb of Rule 151 is used not to describe the particular goods but to describe the kinds of persons who may commit offences defined in clauses (a) to (d) of Rule 151. The word ?warehoused? is contained in the clause ?if the owner of goods warehoused?. The words are intended to qualify the person and do not in any way fix the present of tense so as to make it impossible for the commission of an offence as defined in Clause (d). The offence in Clause (d) is committed by private removal or concealment of any goods either before or after they are warehoused. The contention that no offence under Clause (d) was committed in this case and the goods were not already warehoused does not commend itself to me as correct. In the instant case, the Deputy Collector and the Collector had concurrently found that the petitioner substituted duty payable tobacco with non-duty tobacco. The Central Government accepted the finding. Therefore there is nothing before this Court to show that any of the three Tribunals did not have jurisdiction to pass the impugned order. There is also nothing to show that any of the three Tribunals violated any statutory provision in regard to the procedure that should be followed before passing the impugned order. It does no appeal that there is any error in the finding of fact arrived at by the Tribunals below. Even otherwise it is not for this court to sit in appeal over the finding of fact arrived at by the Tribunals. It is not the case of the petitioner that there is no evidence at all to arrive at the finding. It is not open to the High Court while exercising it extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to sit in appeal over the finding of fact even if the finding appears to the High Court to be erroneous. I do not, therefore find any merit in this Writ Petition which is accordingly dismissed with costs.